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Abst ract
W e i n v es ti gate th e i m pact of 20 t h- c en tur y Europ e a n c ol oni z ati on on gro wth i n Africa. W e
￿nd that g r o wth w as faste r f or de p en denc i e s than f or c o loni e s; for British and F r enc h c o loni e s
than for P ort ug ue se , B elgi an and Ital ia n colo n i e s; and f or coun tries with les s ec o nom i c p e ne-
trati on during the c o loni al p erio d. O n a v er a ge , African gro wt h ac celer a t es after de colo nization.
Pro xi e s f or colo n i al her i tage add expl anatory p o w e r to gro wth regre ss i ons, whi le i n di c a tors for
h um an capital , p ol itical and e thni c i n stabi li t y lose s i gni￿cance . Col onial v a r i ables c apture the
sam e e￿e ct s of a s ub- S a haran dum m y and re duce i t s signi ￿c ance when joi n tly i nc l ude d i n a
cross se ctio nal regre ssion wi th 98 coun tries .
JEL Cla s si￿cati on nos: E 0 0, O 4 0, Q32 , N10 .
Key W ords : Co loni z ati on, Gro wth, A f rica.
￿
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the Euro p ean Asso ciati on of H i stori cal Econo mics 199 6 i n V eni ce a nd the 1996 CEPR Euro p ean Su mmer S ymp o siu m
i n Macro economi cs i n T a rragon a f o r co mmen ts and s ugges tion s.
01 I NTR ODUCTION 1
1 In tr o duct ion
The ma i n go al of an expand ing bra n c h of economics has b een to ￿n d the empi ric a l d eterm i nan ts of
gro wth i n the long r u n
1
. Ho w ev er, l i t tl e att e n t i on has b een dev oted so far to the hi st oric a l causes
of gro wth and de v e lopmen t and , in particu lar, t o t h e fact that man y of to da y’ s gr o wt h \l o sers"
happ en t o b e fo rmer c o l oni es. F or exampl e, of the 2 3 co u n t ri es b el o n g i ng t o the l o w est qui n t i l e
of the cross coun try di st ri buti o n of gr o wt h ra tes of p er-capi t a GDP (a c cor d ing to Su mm e r s a n d
Heston’s ma rk 5 dat a), 19 w ere c o l oni es for a prolonged p e r i o d o f ti me du ring the 20 th cen tury
and a v era ged a m e a n g ro wt h r ate of -1. 3% o v e r t h e 19 60-19 88 sample .
In this pap e r w e empiri call y a sse s s the economic i mpact of c o l oni a l r u le on g ro wt h . W e f o c us
at ten ti o n on Afri ca. T h ere a re se v eral reasons for our c hoic e. F i rst, hi sto ri call y , no w h ere el se w as
col o n ization so far-reac hi ng a n d homog e neous i n n a ture as i n the Afr i can e xp eri ence that b egan
at t he end o f the last cen tury
2
. S econd, i t i s amo n g Afr i can coun tri es t h a t w e ha v e witne s se d
the most di sa strous gro wth p erf ormances i n t h e p o st-WW I I p e r i o d. The gro wth rate of p e r - capita
i ncome o f Afric a n n a ti o n s has b e en b el o w w o rl d a v erage throughout t he l ast ￿ft y y ears: o v er t h e
19 61-73 p erio d the a v erage gro wth ra te of p er-capi t a G DP o f Afric a n coun trie s has only b een 2. 0%
as compared with a 3.0 % a v erag e for the w o rl d a n d a 4. 2% for O ECD coun tries; o v er t he 198 2-90
p erio d the pi ct u r e is e v en bl eak er, wi th African c o u n t ri es di spl a yi ng a nega ti v e a v erag e g ro w th rate
(-0. 2) a s c o mpared t o a 2. 8% fo r O EC D coun tri es. Mor e o v er, 1 6 of the 23 coun tr i es i n the l o w est
qui n til e of the cro ss co u n t ry d istrib ution o f gro wth rates of p er-capi t a GDP b e long to Afric a a n d
all w e r e col onie s
3
. Third, ev en though t h e question of Af ri ca’ s p o o r p e r formance has r e cei v e d
some at ten ti o n in recen t w or k, i ts g ro wt h di sa ster has l ar gel y b een left u nexpl aine d. Barro ( 199 1)
sho w s t h a t a d umm y fo r su b-Sahara n Afric a exerts a signi ￿can t and negat i v e e￿ect on t he a v erage
gro wth of p er-capi t a GDP for t h e 196 0-85 p erio d, suggestin g t h a t the empi rical mo del d o es not
adequatel y expl a i n the p erfor mance o f these co u n t ri es. A n um b er o f rece n t coun try st u di es con￿rm
Barro ’s c o n clu sions
4
. Some pro gress to w ards a deep er u ndersta n di ng of Afri ca’ s sp ec i￿c probl ems
has b e en made b y East e r l y and L evin e ( 1994 ), who i n tro duce add iti o n a l region-sp eci ￿c v ar i abl es -
i nfra structure dev el opmen t, e t h nic div ersi t y , and ne igh b o r spi ll o v er - i n the sta n da rd c r oss-coun try
regressions, and b y S c hmid t -H ebb el (199 5), w h o fo c uses on ￿sc a l i ndi cat ors.
Our basi c conjec t u r e is t h a t col o n iz a ti o n ma y b e the r e a son f or the lo w g ro wt h ra tes of p er-
capi t a G DP i n Afr i can coun tr i es. Co l onial rul e m a y i n f act h a v e crea ted the condi t i ons for a
p erm ane n t redu ct i on i n t h e g ro w th rat e s of t h ese coun tries. B ert o cc h i (1 994) pro vid es a theoretical
mo del of an und erdev el o p ed co u n t ry b efor e a n d aft e r co l oni zat i on ta k es p lace. I n the mo de l,
col o n ial d o mi nation i s c a p t u r e d b y t he presence of restr i cti o ns on foreign i n v est men ts i n t h e colon y ,
un il a teral ly i mp osed b y the me t rop ol itan coun try , a n d of di rect exp loi t ation acti viti es, e xercise d
thro u g h ￿ s c a l a n d tari￿ p oli ci es, fo rce d l ab or, and a v ari et y of ot h er d isto rti o n s
5
. Here w e are
i n t ere s ted , on t h e o n e hand, in v eri fying some of the h yp ot h eses put fo rw ar d i n that pap er and,
on the ot he r , in pro vi di ng some st yli zed fact s o n the e ￿ ec t s o f c o l oni a l rul e o n the gro wth rate of
Afric a n coun tr i es.
T h e empi rical li tera ture has found the cause s of slo w g ro w th i n a n um b er of v ar i abl es ra ngi ng
fro m l i t e r acy and fert i l it y r ates to ma cro ec o n o mi c and so c iop ol iti cal i nd icator s. Ho w ev er, it i s w e ll
kno wn f rom t h e w ork of Levi ne and R enel t (19 92) that most of t h ese v ariabl es ha v e a t e n uous
1
F or a sys t e matic d escri ptio n of recen t dev el op men ts i n gro wth theory , see Barro a nd Sa la-i -Marti n (1995 ).
2
Se e Ol i v er and F ag e (1 962) and Boah en (1990) for a hi story o f Africa .
3
Onl y 5 of the 23 cou n tri es in th e upp er qui n ti le are from the Africa n con ti nent, of w h ic h 3 w ere col on ies .
4
Se e a lso Romer (1989 ), Chh ib b er an d Fi sc her (199 1), B arro an d Lee (1994a ), Hus ain and F aru quee (1 994) and
El bad a wi an d N d ul u (1994 ) o n the si gni ￿can ce of Afri can contin en t dummi es.
5
Se e a lso Lu cas (1990 ) a nd Gros sman an d Iyig un (199 5) on the econ omi cs of co lon ia li sm.1 I NTR ODUCTION 2
expl anat ory p o w er, i n the sense t hat thei r si g n and s i gni ￿cance c hange wi t h the v ar i abl es i ncl ude d
i n the empi ri ca l mo del . In other w o rds, these v ar i abl es ma y b e pro xying for a v ar i et y o f e ￿ ec t s not
captured i n the empi ri ca l sp ec i￿c a ti o n . Our s e cond w orkin g assumption is that coloni al i nheri t anc e
ma y b e the thi rd fa ctor c a u sing cros s secti ona l como v emen ts of so me of t he se v ariabl es w i th t h e
gro wth ra te of GD P . Through for c ed l a b or and di st ort i v e edu cat i onal p oli ci es, for e xa mpl e, c o l o-
ni zat i on ma y ha v e a￿ e cted h uman capi ta l accum ul at i on and b een r e s p onsi ble fo r the c urr e n t l y l o w
l ev el of l iteracy ra tes. T h e hi gh degree of p ol iti cal i nsta b il i t y and ethn ic c o n ￿ic t
6
whi c h c hara c -
teriz es Afric a n coun tries can al s o b e view ed a s a le g acy o f co l oni zat i on. Whe n col onial domi nat i on
end ed, Afric a found h erself di vi ded i n t o a n um b er o f ce n t rali zed s tates wh o se b o rd ers , h a vi ng b ei ng
de￿ ned b y t h e Europ ean p o w ers, had nothi ng t o do wi t h the fron t i ers that d eli mi t ed the tribal
terr i tor i es of t h e pre-col o n ial t i mes. The l ac k o f c r e dib il i t y of the p ost - ind ep e nden ce go v ernmen ts
ma y al so ha v e i ts r o ots in the de s tructi o n of t he pre-col o n ial p ol iti ca l i nstituti o n s b y t h e coloni zers.
T h e empi ri ca l anal ysis is orga n ize d i n four p a rts. I n the ￿rst part , w e rep or t b a si c s tatistic s on
sel ected v a ri a b le s once h etero gene iti es ha vi ng t o do w i th t h e coun tr i es’ coloni a l hi st ory a re tak e n
i n t o accoun t. The n, w e try to m e a su r e the e ￿ ects of d ecoloni zat i on b y fo cusi ng on the gro wth
patt e r n i n the y e a rs i mmedi at e ly p recedi ng and foll o wi ng p o l i t i cal in dep ende nce. In t h e thi rd
part w e run standard cross-secti o n a l gro wth regressi o ns fo r Afri ca addi ng to t h e standard set of
v ari a b les u sed i n the l iterat u r e in dic a tors for coloni al i nh eritance. F i nal ly , w e go bac k t o Barro ’s
(1 991) gr o wt h regressions and exa mi ne whether pro xi es f or co l oni a l heritage d r i v e t he i mp ort anc e
of t h e sub- Sahar a Afri can du m m y a w a y .
Our resul t s sho w that there are economical ly si g n i￿ ca n t di ￿ ere nces in the gro wth ra tes and i n
ot h er m acro ec o n o mi c and so ci op oli tic a l once w e gr oup A f ri can coun tries accordi ng t o p o l i t i cal sta-
tus, metro p oli ta n rul er and the degree of economic p e netr ati o n . Coun tr i es t h a t w ere dep ende nci es
p erf orm b ett e r than former c o l onie s, and for mer Briti sh and F renc h col o n ies p e r form b ett e r than
col o n ies of ot h er coun tr i es, w h il e a hi gher degree of economi c p e netra ti o n duri ng t h e coloni al p eri o d
tends to b e ass o c iated wi t h slo w e r g ro w th.
F or a subset o f African coun tries, w e al so ￿nd that the a v erag e gro wth r ate of G DP a fter
p o l iti cal ind ep e nden ce w as substan ti all y hi gher than b efor e i ndep ende nce a n d that a c t ual gro wth
rat es exc eeded fo recasted ones b y 1-2% , where forecast s are based on the i nfor mation a v ail abl e
b efo re i nd ep e nden ce.
T h e regressi o n analysi s d emo n st rat e s that our pro xie s for coloni al heri t age a re imp or tan t i n
expl ain in g the Afri ca n g ro w th exp eri ence i n almost al l sampl es. In p a rti cul a r, b ein g e ither a co l on y
of F r anc e, a dep ende ncy of t h e UK, or a coun try with a l o w l ev el of economi c p e netra ti o n , had some
b ene￿c ial gro wth e ￿ ects. W e al so ￿nd that pro xy measures for h u m an capi t al , p o l i t i cal and et h ni c
sta b il it y , w h ic h are t ypi cal ly used i n gr o wt h regressi o n s, are co rrel at e d w i th o u r col o n ial v ar i abl es
and l ose so me of thei r expl a n a tory p o w er when t h ey a re joi n t l y i ncl uded in t he r e g ressi ons. He nce,
what has b e en i n terpreted as the e￿ ec t o f, e. g., p o l i t i cal st abi l it y , ma y ha v e in fa c t pro xi ed for a
dee p er p henomenon wh ic h w e i de n t i fy with c o l oni a l i nheri t anc e.
F i nall y , w e sho w that o v er a w orld sampl e of 98 coun trie s our col onial v a ri able s capture t he same
e￿ects o f a sub-S a h a ran Afri ca d umm y and consid era b ly redu ce i t s si g n i￿ ca n ce i n the regression.
Therefore, our resul t s suggest that col o n ial h istor y can i ndeed p la y a cruci al role i n expl a i ni ng t h e
p o o r p erfo rmance o f Afri can nations rel at i v e to o the r co n ti nen ts.
T h e r e st of t he pa p er is org ani zed a s foll o ws: Secti o n 2 bri e￿y di scusses a t h eor e t i cal framew ork
whi c h he lp s us to mo ti v ate the empiri cal in v esti g ation a n d i n t e r p r e t t h e resul t s; Secti o n 3 presen ts
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Se e Da v id son (1992) on the e￿ ects o f col oni al rul e on i ns t i tuti on s i n Afri ca. Usi ng a v ari abl e con structed b y Mau ro
(199 5), Easterl y an d Levi ne (19 94) ￿nd t h at ethni c di v ersi t y i s nega t i v el y as so ci ated with gro wth in sub-S aharan
Africa. Ind eed, f o urteen ou t o f the ￿ f teen most ethni cal l y di v erse so ci eti es i n the w o rld i n 19 60 w ere in Afri ca.2 A THEO RETICAL F R AMEW OR K 3
the dat a and the c r i teria used t o c lassify a n d group c o u n t ri es; Sec t i on 4 d escrib es t he resul ts ; a n d
Sec t i on 5 dra ws some conc lu s i ons.
2 A the o ret i cal fr am ew ork
A the o reti cal a n a l ysis of the e co n o mi c impact of c o l oni za ti o n wi t h in a sta n da rd gr o wt h mo del wi th
o v erl appi ng gene r ations and o n e capi ta l g o o d i s pro vid ed i n Berto cc hi (19 94). The m o d el i den ti￿ es
t w o ma i n features of c o l oni a l economi c domin a ti o n : (i) the sto c k o f l o cal ca p ital i s augmen t e d b y
an e xo gen o u s ￿o w of for e ign di r e ct i n v estmen t (p ossi bl y i n the for m o f in fr astr u cture) con tr ol le d
b y t h e met rop o l i t an coun try and restri ct e d so as t o k eep l o cal returns t o capi t al highe r than i n t h e
metro p oli s
7
; (ii ) the metr op o l i t an coun tr y exerts di rect exp loi t ation on the colon y , in the form of
ta xe s, tari￿s, forced lab or and s o on.
T h e mo del sho ws t h a t, u nder real isti c preferen ce paramet e r s v alu es, for e ign i n v estm e n t t en ds
to in crea se the col on y ’s GDP , t h u s creat i ng a \mo derni zation" i mpul se, e v en aft er t aki ng in to
accoun t the fa c t t h a t forei g n i n v e s tmen t c a n a￿ ec t lo cal capi ta l forma ti on b y decreasin g the return t
to sa ving. Stil l , b ecause of t he d ra i n represen ted b y repatr i ated pro￿t s, an in creas e i n GDP i s
accompani ed b y a fal l i n GNP , whi c h can b e tak en as a mor e a c curat e meas u re of a coun t ry’s
l ivi ng standards. Th e l a tter i mpl icati o n, tog ethe r with t h e observ a ti o n that t h e i mpact of di rect
expl oitation o n GDP i s unam b iguousl y n ega ti v e , sup p ort s the vie w of c o l oni zat i on as a \drain of
w ea l th".
A t in dep ende nce, fo rei gn di rect i n v estm e n t from the metro p oli s is withd r a wn and the p osi t i v e
i mpul se termin a tes. Ho w e v e r , t h e d a mages p r o d uced b y expl o i ta ti o n activi tie s to the coun t ry’s
economi c a n d p ol iti cal i nstituti o ns ma y p ermanen tly remai n
8
. T h e com b in ed e￿ect o n g ro w th of
i n v e s tmen t wi t hd r a w a l s and p erma n en t m ysfun ctions i s negativ e.
Em p iri call y , the impl i cat i ons of the mo de l can b e tested b y exa mi ni ng the g ro w th p erform anc e
of co l oni es r e lativ e to that o f i nde p end en t c o u n t ri es. If the conc lusi ons a re c o rrect, o n e shoul d
exp ect w o rse g ro wt h p e r forma n ces for for me r coloni es than f or c o u n t ri es that w e r e not sub ject
to c o l oni a l rul e. M oreo v er, amo n g d i￿eren t coloni al regi mes, those whi c h w ere c haract e r i zed b y
mor e in tense p ene t rat i on and exp loi t ation shoul d pro du ce sl o w er gro wth i n the col o n ies. Fi nall y ,
a lo w v a l ue of t h e G NP/GDP rat i o duri ng c o l oni a l t i mes pro vi des evi den ce of i n tense economi c
p enetra ti o n and shoul d l ead to w orse gro wth p erfo rmance in t h e p ost-coloni al phase.
An imp o rtan t extensi o n of t h e mo de l expl i citl y rec o gni zes the r ol e o f h uman capital i n t h e
dev el opmen t pro cess
9
, a n d sho ws h o w the rapid pro cess of in dustrial ization i nd uced b y f orei gn
i n v e s tmen t ma y create a c hronic r e lativ e shorta ge of h uman capi ta l whi c h wil l hamp er gro wth
ev en after dec o l oni za ti o n . Th is represe n t s an add iti o n a l c hanne l through whi c h col o n iz a ti o n can
exert p erma n en t , and negat i v e, gro wth e￿ ec t s. Its t e st abl e i mpl ic a ti o n i s t h a t, if coloni zat i on i s
i mp ort an t for gro wth, then there shoul d b e a cor rel at i on b et w ee n v ar i abl es p r o xyin g for t h e l ev el
of h uman capi ta l and v ar i abl es whi c h accoun t for a c o u n t ry’s coloni al p a st.
7
Svedb e rg (1981 ) do cu men ts th at col oni al do min atio n w as i nd eed c h aracteri zed b y restri cti ons on d irect f o reign
i n v estment, whi c h w ere ac hi ev ed thro ugh mo nop o li sti c practi ces and di scrimi na tion agai nst thi rd cou n tri es.
8
Chari , K e ho e and M cGrattan (199 6) i n tro duce a si mil arl y-i n terpreted p ro cess of di storti ons i n to a g ro wt h mo del
i n ord er to exp lai n in come di spa riti es acro ss cou n trie s. Ho w ev er, they do no t o￿er for th is p ro cess an i n terpre t a tion
i n terms of colo ni al h erita ge.
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3 Hi stor y , geog rap h y a nd e m pi ri cal q ui bbl es
The assessm e n t of the economi c e￿ ec t s of col o n iz a ti o n i s i n trinsi cal ly a l ong-t e r m i s su e. O nly a
data set co v ering t h e whol e \new" co l oni a l era ( roughl y sp eaking, from 188 0 t o 1975 ) co u ld tel l us
ho w i mp orta n t col o n ial ism has b ee n fo r gro wth. Unfort u nat e ly , ho w ev er, suc h d a ta fo r Afric a i s
not a v ai labl e. Ma d di so n (1 995) pro vi des estimates of G DP a nd p opul a ti o n for a sele ct e d n u m b er
coun tries bac k t o the pa st ce n t u r y , but no Afri can nation i s i ncl ude d i n hi s sample . M i tc hel l ( 198 2)
i s e quall y sil en t on output data for col onial Afr i ca. The r e f ore, i n order t o i n v e s ti g ate the questions of
i n t ere s t, w e a re forced to tak e a n ind irec t approac h a n d measure t h e imp a ct of coloni a l i nheri t anc e
usi ng a n um b er of i ndi cat ors constructed fr om the part l y \ex-p os t" Su mm e r s a n d He st on ( 199 1)
data f or the sampl e 196 0-198 8.
T h e qual it y o f the d a ta in t h e sample is p o o r and so mewhat dub ious, si nce fo r some of t he se
coun tries n a ti o n a l accoun ts w ere not a v a i labl e un ti l l at er i n the 60 ’s and, i n some cases, missi ng
data w ere reconstr u cted b y in terp ol a ti on, ta ki ng coun tr i es at si mil ar stag es of dev el o p m e n t as
b enc hmark. Thi s shoul d b e k ept i n mi nd w h en d iscu ss i ng the st atisti ca l si gni￿ cance o f the resul t s,
as thi s data constr u ction pro cedu r e bi ases the st atisti cs of i n terest t o w a rd uni for mi t y . W e att e m p t e d
to tak e t h e p o o r qual it y o f the dat a i n t o consi derat i on usi ng Summers and H est on ratings as
heterosk edast i ci t y w ei g h ts. Ho w ev er, sinc e all the Afr i can c o u n t ri es ha v e ra ti ngs b e t w een C (p o o r)
and D (i nsu￿ci en t) , the resul ts w e presen t are i n v arian t t o thi s data re￿ nemen t.
W h il e our anal ysis c o u ld a l so ta k e in to accoun t the exp eri ence o f coloni es of ot h er con tine n t s,
i t shoul d b e not i ced that the p r o c ess o f col o n ization i n South and Cen tr al America, for i nstance,
dates b a c k t o t h e 17th c en t u ry and w as essen tial ly t e r mi nated a t t h e b egin nin g of the curren t
cen tury w h en no rel i a bl e st atisti cs on national accoun ts e xisted. Asi an c o l oniz a ti o n w as hi st ori call y
substan t i all y di ￿ eren t a n d sho w ed m uc h le ss un iformit y , a l ong se v eral d imen s i ons, t h a n the Afri can
case. The timi ng of t h e c o l oni zat i on of Asian coun tries has b ee n l ess homo gen eo u s, wi th the un iqu e
exp erie nce of I ndi a, and the US as in ￿uen ti a l new comers. I n addi tion, Japanese col o n ization of
T aiw an a nd K o rea had a v ery p ecul i a r c har acter s i nc e the ga p b et w een the l ev e l of de v el opmen t
of Japan and of i t s co l oni es w as rel at i v ely s mal l; also, the geogra p hic a l pro ximi t y of Japan to
i t s coloni es broug h t t o cen terst age st rat e g i c and mil itary consi derations t h a t shap ed J a p a ne se
col o n ial p o l i cy to w ar d s a more d ev elopme n t al di rection. Fi nall y , J a p a n ese mi gr ation to T aiw an
and Korea w as sub st an tial , as i n t h e c a se of the Bri t i sh empi re and i ts whi te c o l oni es. Al l of t he se
consi derat i ons l ed u s t o conc en t rate at ten ti o n o n African coun t ri es onl y .
Our in v estigation also do es not consi der the p oten tial i mpact of coloni zat i on on t he metrop ol itan
coun tries. Econom i c hi st ori a n s agr e e that c o l oni zat i on d id not s i gni ￿can tly a￿ ect g ro wt h i n t h e
col o n ial p o w ers
10
. Economic in terests w e r e not the onl y facto r justi f yi ng col o n ial expansi o n , a n d
p o l iti cal and ev en h umani t arian consi derat i ons pla y ed a si g n i￿ ca n t ro l e
1 1
. The most i n t e r e st i ng
e￿ects on t h e me t rop ol itan c o u n t ri es h a v e t o do wi t h the r e di s tri bution of w ealth a mong di￿eren t
so ci a l cl asses op erated b y c o l oni a l en terpri s e s
1 2
.
It is n o t cl ear, in a stud y w h ic h t ri es to assess the i mpact of coloni ali sm o n g ro wt h , wh a t i s t h e
rel ev an t m e a su r e of in come t hat shoul d b e use d. The exi st i ng li terat ure on gro wth has u sed i ncome
(o r GD P) p e r - capita, p er-w o rk er or p er-equi v al en t-adul t al m ost ind isti nctiv el y o n t h e a ssump t i on
that the sign a n d the mag n itud e of the a v e r age g ro w th ra tes of these a ggrega tes do n o t v ary great l y
acro ss coun tri es. Ho w ev er, for a study based o n A f ri can coun trie s , thi s issue ma y b e o f i mp ort anc e
as p o p ul a ti o n gro wth has b een accel erat i ng o v er the l a st d ecades and t h e d eci sion proble m of femal es
10
Se e, for examp le, Bai ro c h (1 993).
11
Se e G all agh er and R obi nson (1953) for a di scus sio n.
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i n Afr i can famil ie s i s v e r y di ￿eren t from that o f w e st e r n femal es. T h is suggest s that a measure
of i ncome p er-w or k er is probably mor e appropri a te. Ho w ev e r , just b ecause p opul at i on is g ro wing,
a wi der m e a su r e of i ncome suc h a s in com e p er-capi t a ma y g i v e a mo re compl et e o v e r vi ew o f t h e
ph enomena. T o u ndersta n d h o w i mp orta n t the se facto rs a re fo r t h e i ssues o f in terest w e p erfor me d
cal cul a ti o n s u s i ng b oth G DP p er-c a p ita and GDP p er-w o rk er, w i th t h e exp ec t ation that l o w er
a v erage g ro wt h rates w oul d b e d isp la y e d b y t he f ormer a n d a ti g h ter rel a ti o n ship w i th coloni ali sm
(if i t a ￿ected m e a n s o f p rod ucti o n a n d di st ri buti o n ) w oul d b e sho wn b y t h e l a tter. Thi s t u r n ed out
not to b e the c a se, pro b a b ly b ecause of the l ar ge comp onen t of measuremen t e r ror presen t i n b oth
seri es. C onsequ en tly , w e presen t onl y resul ts o b t ai ned u sin g GDP p e r capita.
W h il e t he a v ai labl e da ta c o v ers the 19 60-198 8 p eri o d
13
, i t is useful t o st ud y gro wth pat terns o v er
three s u bsample s - 1 960 - 7 3, 1974 -80, 198 1-88 - t o exam i ne ho w qui c kly t h e e￿ects of c o l oni zat i on
di ed o u t a n d whe t he r t h ere i s a more un iform gro wt h b eha v i or i n the last subsampl e, when t h e
i n￿ue nces w e a re i n terest e d in exa mi ni ng could ha v e v a n ishe d. F or the sam e reason, w e also deci de d
to study a sampl e whic h , for eac h coun try , r anges from the dat e of i ndep end ence (or t he b egi nni ng
of t h e data if i nd ep en denc e o ccu rr e d b e fo re t he dat a start ed ) , up t o 198 8. I deall y , t o study t h e
e￿ects of coloni zat i on, w e w oul d ha v e l ik ed to ha v e h a d a sa mpl e that w e n t fro m the b egi nni ng
of the sampl e up t o i ndep ende nce. Ho w ev er, this sampl e for m an y coun tries i ncl udes onl y a few
y ear s and sa mpl i ng err or i s li k ely to b e v ery l ar ge. M oreo v er, i ncome data for the ￿rst few y ears i n
the 1960 s i s u nli k el y to b e preci sely m e a su r e d, and thi s ma y in duce substan t i al me a sureme n t e r ror
i n t h e g ro w th rat es for thi s s h o rt sa mpl e. Therefore, to study the p eri o d when col o n iz a ti o n sti ll
exi st e d, w e com p a re t he resul t s obtain ed for t h e 196 0-198 8 and t h e i ndep ende nce-1988 s ampl es.
T a b le 1 p r e s e n t s som e summary i nfor mation ab out the hi sto ry o f the 4 6 Afr i can coun tr i es in -
cl ude d in the p a n el: fo r eac h coun try , w e r e p ort the p o l i t i cal stat u s and , fo r eac h col o n y , w e i ndi cate
the corresp ond ing metro p oli ta n c o u n t ry and the y ear of i nde p en denc e. The c lassi￿ cat i on i n t e r ms of
the p ol iti cal sta tus di st i ngui shes b e t w een coloni es, dep end enci es a n d in dep e nden t coun tr i es. T h ere
are onl y t w o coun trie s whi c h w e cl assify as i nd ep en den t: Ethi o pi a and Li b e r i a, whic h w e r e i ndee d
free duri ng mo st of the rel ev a n t p e r i o d. Ethi opia w a s conqu ered b y Italy i n 19 35-36 , but l ib er-
at e d in 1 941 . H o w ev er, i t shoul d b e not e d t h a t as o f 19 88, the ￿ nal y ear o f the sample , i t sti ll
i ncl uded Er i trea , whic h w as an Itali an colon y from 1890 to 19 50. Li b eria w a s i ni t i all y col o n ize d
b y fo rmer sla v es se n t o v er b y Nor th Ameri can phi lan tro p hists, but b ecame a so v ereign coun try
i n 18 47. Among de p en denci es, w e i ncl ude six coun tri es t h a t w ere not sub j e ct t o expl i ci t c o l onial
rul e, bu t sti ll had cl os e p ol itic a l and/or e conom i c ti es w i th a met rop o l itan coun try ( i n al l cases,
the UK). Th is gr oup i ncl ud es Sout h A f ri ca, whi c h w a s a Briti s h d o mi ni on
1 4
, t he S o u t h a fri can
enc la v e s o f Le so tho and Sw azil and, as w ell as nei g h b or i ng Bot sw ana ( former R ho de sia), b e ca u se
thei r e co n o mi es had v ery ti g h t connec t i ons with that of S o u t h Afri ca for t h e p eri o d unde r exami -
nation
1 5
. Zi m b a b w e is i n t h e same ca tegory , si nce af ter 1 923 i t w as e s se n t i all y sub jec t t o t he same
p o l iti cal rule s as South Afri ca. F i nal ly , Egypt is viw ed a s a dep end ency ev e n i f i t b ec a me p ol iti call y
i ndep end en t i n 192 2, b oth b e cause of its long col o n ial h istor y and b ecause o f the he a vy economi c
i n￿ue nce exerted b y the UK ev e n after p o l i t i cal i ndep end ence w a s o b t ai ned. I t i s i m p ort an t to note
that the UK d eci sion not to coloni ze South Afric a and to gran t Egypt i nd ep en denc e ear l y on w as
based not o n ec o n o mi c, but mi l itar y and stra tegi c c o n side r ations, and li nk ed to the fact t hat b oth
13
Da ta are a v ai l abl e from the b egi nn in g of th e 19 50’s on ly for a few cou n tri es (Egy pt, Ethi opi a, Keny a, N i geri a,
Moro cco, M auri tani a, Sou t h A fri ca, U g anda a nd Z aire).
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The p ol i t i cal co ndi ti on of domi ni on , whi c h es sen ti al ly mean t sel f -go vernan ce, w as o btai ned b y those Bri tish
col oni es whi c h ha d attracted a larg e ￿o w of mi grati on from th e mother cou n try . S outh Afric a w as o ne of them (from
191 9 to 1961), together wi th C a nad a, Austra li a and N ew Ze ala nd.
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Si zab le sp il l o v er e￿ ects among th ese countries a re als o f o und by Easterl y an d Levi ne (19 94) and B arro and
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coun tries h a d exp e r i en ced l ar ge B r i tish i mmi g rat i on. T h is rul es out p oten tial pro b lems of rev erse
causation b e t w een the p ol iti cal sta tus of d ep e nden cy a n d g ro w th, whi c h ma y distort the resul t s of
our analysi s. T h e remaini ng 38 coun tries are c lassi￿ ed as col o n ies.
W e as si gned m e t rop ol itan coun trie s b y sele ct i ng the c o l oni a l p o w er t h a t manag e d to rul e for
a longer p eri o d of ti m e . W e di vi ded the form e r Germa n co l oni es - Burund i, Cam e r o on, R w anda,
T anzani a, a n d T ogo - amo n g t h e coun trie s t h a t to ok them o v er aft er W WI. B urundi and Rw anda
app e a r und er Bel giu m and T anzani a und er the UK. Camero on and T ogo w ere sub jec t t o a join t
F renc h and Bri t i sh ma n dat e. Ho w ev er, T ogo i s l i st ed u nder F r anc e o n ly , b ec a u se c urren t l y t h e
coun try c o n sists o f the F renc h p o rtion, whi l e t h e Briti sh par t w as annexe d t o Ghana. Camero on
curren tl y i ncl ud es the p or ti o n wh ic h w en t u nder F renc h mandat e and the southern p o rti o n of t h e
Bri t i sh mandate (the n o rthern p a rt w a s a n nexed t o Ni geria). Here w e l i s t i t und er F r anc e si nce it
i s curren tly p a rt of t h e CF A -fr anc a rea. W e a l so consid er the form e r G erman col o n ie s a s a sep a rate
gro u p i n an attempt t o se e i f there w as an y thi ng p ecul i a r a b o u t t h ese coun tri es. Final ly , M oro cco
w a s un der t h e j oi n t protecto rate o f F rance and Sp a i n, b ut w e ha v e p laced it unde r F rance, a n d
Somali a app ea rs unde r Italy , ev en i f there w ere ( smal ler) B r i tish and F r e nc h p ort i ons. Li b y a w as
also an I t al ian c o l on y for an ext e nded p e r i o d (19 12-194 3) but i t do es not app e a r i n our d a ta set.
W e c o mpi l ed i ndep ende nce dates usin g the Encycl op e dia Britanni ca a s a source . When try-
i ng to di st i ngui sh b et w e en coloni al and p ost -c o l onial r e g i mes, one shoul d b e a w a re that p oli tical
i ndep end ence do es not ne cessar i l y coi nci de with economic i ndep end ence. F or some coun tr i es, t h e
pro cess of ec o n o mi c de coloni zat i on pred a tes the end o f p oli t i cal con t rol . F or ot h ers, features of
col o n ial dep ende nce p ersisted a n d w ere detectabl e w el l p a st the e nd of coloni al t i mes
4 A sum m ar y of the r e su l t s
4.1 T abulations and te sts
T o b egin with w e presen t s tatistic s desc r i bi ng the cross secti o n a l p a ttern of the a v erage gro wth rates
of GD P(￿Y ) o n ce w e condi t i on on a set of v a ri able s de s c r i bi ng c o l oni a l stat u s, i . e . , the p oli tical
sta tus, t he me t rop ol itan rule r and the de g ree of economic p ene t ration. F or eac h tabul a ti o n , w e
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and compute t h e cro ss sectional c o rrel at i on b et w ee n me a n gro wth r ates a n d t he l og of GDP p er
capi t a at the b egin nin g o f e a c h sa mpl e.
W e a l so st ud y t h e imp a ct of p ol iti ca l sta tus and of metro p o l i t an rul ers on a set of macro eco-
nomic and so ci o p oli t i cal v a ri a b les t yp ical ly t h o u g h t to a￿ect the g ro w th ra te o f G DP . The v a ri -
abl es w e consi der are the i n v estmen t-output rat i o (I/Y), t he p e r c en ta ge o f w orking age p opul at i on
i n sec o n dar y sc ho ol ( S c ho ol), the i ndex o f p ol iti ca l i nstabi li t y ( P oli nst), the in dex of e t h nic fra c -
tional ization (F r act) and the pri ce of i n v e st men t in de viation fro m the w orld mean (Pid ev) , all
measured i n 1960 , and the ind ex of p ol iti ca l ri g h ts (Pr i gh t ), whi c h is m e a su r e d o v er the p eri o d
60 - 6 4 All meas u res are fr om Bar ro a n d L ee (1 994 b ) , with the excepti on of t h e sc h o o l i ng measure,
empl o y ed b y M anki w, R omer a n d W ei l (19 92), whi c h i s fr om UNES C O , and t h e ethni c i nsta b il it y
i ndex, e mplo y ed b y Mauro (19 95) , w h ic h w a s cal cul a ted b y T a yl or and Hud so n (19 72) . Resu lts
obta i ned su bstitutin g measures of coup s, ass assi nat i ons a n d r e v ol utions to the i ndex of p oli tical
i nst abi l it y a n d ot h er me a sures of h uman capi t al t o the sc ho ol atta i nmen t ra tes are v ery si mil ar a n d
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4.1. 1 P ol it ica l s t atus
In T abl e 2 w e prese n t the mean and st and a rd devi a ti o n of the gro wth rate of GD P o n ce w e sep a rate
coun tries a cc o rdi ng to t h ei r p oli tic a l sta tus (col o n ies, de p en denci es, and i nde p en den t coun tries).
T h e m ost in teresting feat u r e i n the ta b le i s that the a v e r age gr o wt h rat e of dep ende nci es f or t h e
19 60-88 sample i s ab out three or four time s l a rger than t h e one of for mer coloni es or i nd ep en den t
coun tries a n d thi s pat tern is p r e s e n t in a l l ot he r sa mpl es
16
. The gro wth p a ttern of coun tries that
w ere i nd ep e nden t f or t h e en t i re p eri o d - i.e., Ethi opi a and Li b e r i a - i s t h e w ors t o v er mo st subsam-
pl es. Ho w ev er, i t sh o u ld b e k ept i n min d t h a t si nce there are onl y t w o i nde p en den t coun t ri es, small
sample bi a se s a re s u bsta n ti a l . Th e di ￿ e r e nces w e d et e ct a re economical ly s i gni ￿can t, esp ec ial ly for
some of t h e v ery p o or form e r coloni es. T o g e t a rough e s ti ma te of suc h di ￿ eren ces, note that , for
exampl e, a 3 % a v erage gro wth rate o v e r the 1 960 - 8 8 p eri o d i mpl ie d at the end of the sa mp le an
a v erage p er c a p ita i ncome 3 .5 ti mes l ar ger t h a n the one o f 19 60, as opp o se d to an a v erage p er
capi t a i ncome 1 .6 ti mes l arg er than t h e one of 1 960 h a d the a v e r age g ro wt h rat e b een 1% p er y e a r.
In mo st cases the s e di ￿ eren ces are not sta ti st i call y si g n i￿ can t at the 10% le v e l, b ecause o f the large
sta n dar d erro rs asso ci a ted w i th the c r oss sec t i onal mean g ro wth rate.
T h e rel at i onshi p b et w ee n the log of the i niti al G DP and the a v erag e gr o wt h rat e, whi c h a moun ts
to a crude test of the u ncondi tional con v erg e nce h yp ot h esis, i s qu ite s trong when all coun tri es are
p o o l ed t ogether. Ho w ev er, when w e separat e coun tries a c co rd ing to the p oli tic a l stat u s , w e se e
that the r ate of con v e r gen ce i s f ast fo r d ep en denc ies, whil e for coloni es w e ev en ￿ nd evi den ce of
di v erg e nce.
In a n at tempt to measure col onial he r i ta ge in the b r oadest p o ssi bl e manne r , in T able 3 w e
analyz e the impact of the sam e cl ass i ￿c a ti o n on the ma c r o e conom i c a n d so ci op ol iti ca l v ar i abl es
previ ously descri b e d. The r e s u lts i nd icate that col onial hi sto ry had a m ark ed e￿ e ct on al l v ariabl es:
on a v e r age, de p end enci es h a d hi gher i n v e st men t-output ratios, h uman capi ta l and p ol iti cal ri gh t s,
and l o w er p ol iti ca l i nsta b il it y , ethni c fra c t i onali zat i on and mark e t di sto rtions than col o n ie s . Henc e
col o n ization m a y ha v e had an i ndi rect e￿ect on gro wth as w e ll
4.1. 2 M et r op oli ta n ruler
It i s w el l do cumen ted that co l oni a l p oli ci es of the v arious me t rop ol itan p o w ers di ￿ e r e d consi derabl y
i n terms o f the degree of ec o n o mi c p enetrat i on, the i n tensi t y of the e xpl o i ta ti o n o f nat ural reso u r c es
and i nd igenous l ab or, l o cal e ducational p ol ici es, and t h e ki nd of p o l i t i cal in s ti t u t i ons establ ishe d i n
the coloni es. F or exampl e, P o rtuguese domi nat i on is b el i ev ed to ha v e b een particu larly de t ri men t al
for gro wth b ec a u se of the extr e me forms of expl oitat i on empl o y ed. The same can b e said of t h e
early Ki ng Le o p old’s regi m e i n Congo . On the other h a n d, t he \in direc t r u li ng" whi c h c haracterize d
Bri t i sh domi nat i on i n Afric a i s though t t o ha v e fa v or e d the creation of a str onger l o cal r u li ng
cl as s wi t h b ene ￿ci a l conseque nces for p o st-i ndep end ence p oli tical s tabi li t y . Al so, F rance probabl y
con tr i bu t ed more t h a n an y ot he r col oniz er to the d ev elopmen t of i nfra structure. Educational
p o l ic ie s w ere a l so sub ject to v ery d i￿eren t g u id eli nes. Fi nall y , whe n Bri t ai n’s coloni es b ecame
i ndep end en t t h e Briti sh si mply left, whil e i n si mi lar ci r c umst anc es the F renc h r e ma i ned .
D esp ite the exi st en ce of a large b o dy of h istor i cal ly-orie n t e d descri ptiv e li tera ture
17
, previ ous
w o rk has b een unabl e t o detect an y di￿eren tial p a ttern al ong the met rop o l itan di m e nsion. F or
16
Al am (1994) al so stu di ed whether grow th ten ds to b e p osi tively r elated to the degre es of p ol iti cal in dep enden ce
an d foun d some evi dence of a di screp ancy in the g ro w th rate of s o v erei gn co un tri es an d col on ies f o r the p erio d 19 00-
50. Ho w ev er, h is sa mpl e i s v ery smal l (o nl y 1 2 coun tri es are i ncl uded ), no Africa n nati on i s p resen t and th e t e sts h e
p erforms a re d i￿ eren t tha n ours.
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exampl e, v on de r Meh den (196 9) cl a i ms that there is no si gni￿ can t e vide nce that a coun t ry’s
economi c p e r forma n ce de p en ds on whi c h metr op o l i s coloni zed it. Mo re rec en tly , B a rro ( 1996 ) ￿n ds
that d i￿eren t coloni al r u lers h a d no signi ￿can t i mpact o n t h e l ev el of d emo cra c y .
Our resul t s, ho w ev er, o￿er so me su pp ort f or the b eli ef that economic p erfor mance s in A f ri ca
w ere a￿ e cted b y t h e ki nd of coloni al reg i me t h a t w as i n pl ace. T able 4 sho ws that fo rmer F ren c h
and Briti s h col o n ies had the hi g h est a v erage gro wth of GDP p e r - capita for the 1960 - 1 988 p e r i o d.
Despi t e the presence of som e he t erogenei t y withi n su bsa mp les, i t therefore app ear s t h a t ha vi ng
the UK o r F rance a s the co l oni zer di d mak e a di ￿ eren ce for g ro w th. Not s u rprisi ngly , giv en t h e
small sampl e size of eac h su bgr oup , sta n dar d errors asso ci a ted wi t h the mean g ro wt h rat es are
l a rge and di ￿ e r e nces are o ften not st atisti call y signi ￿can t at t h e 1 0% l ev e l. W e h a v e also separa tel y
studi ed t he p erf ormance o f t h o se coun tr i es t hat w ere ori g i nall y German c o l oni es and w ere a c qui r e d
b y t he UK , F ra n ce a n d B elgi um after WWI. The fact that thi s sub g roup di d de￿n iti v e ly b etter
than a v erage up t o 19 80 shoul d ho w e v e r b e att ri buted t o the fact t h a t most o f these coun t ri es are
oil pro du cers, r ather than to the c haract e r i stic s o f the ear l y col o n ial regime.
T h e rel at i onshi p b et w e en ini tial cond iti o n s and cros s secti o n a l gro wth ra tes v aries withi n eac h
subgroup, and there are sev era l subsampl es where i ncome di ￿ eren ces o f former c o l oni es o f the same
metro p oli s p e r si sted or ev en i ncreased .
T h e resul ts so fa r are onl y suggestiv e of the di ￿ eren ti a l ec o n o mi c i mpact of alternat i v e c o l onial
regimes, unl ess w e can pro vi de so me evi den ce t h a t d i￿eren t metrop oli tan rul ers d id i n fa ct exerci se
di ￿ e r e n t degrees of economi c p enetrat i on. Un fo rtunatel y , data o n di rect for e ign i n v estm e n t , d isag-
greg ated b y coun try o f origi n and reci pi en t, are not a v ai labl e for the p erio d unde r exami nat i on
1 8
.
A t the b ot tom of T abl e 4 , w e rep ort d a ta o n e nfor c emen t ratios fo r for e ign di rect in v estmen t a n d
tr ade i n Afric a for 193 8, the y e a r that mar ks the p e a k of the col o n ial e p o c h. These rat i os , tak e n
fro m Sv edb e r g (198 1)
19
, re￿ ect the me t rop ol itan coun try shares of for e ign d irec t i n v estm e n t a n d
tr ade i n Afri can coloni es relativ e to the metrop oli tan coun t ry shares in the c o n ti nen t a n d t ak e in to
accoun t the fact that larger economi es tends t o h a v e l ar ger sh a res o f o v era l l for e ign i n v estm e n t a n d
i n t ern a ti o n a l tra d e. The for e ign i n v estm e n t enforcemen t rat i o for Britain , fo r exam p le, is sli gh t l y
ab o v e 2, i ndi cat i ng that i n the a v erag e Briti sh col o n y in Afric a t h e share of the UK i n t ota l for-
ei gn d irec t i n v estmen t i s a b out doub le that of the en ti re c o n ti nen t. Consisten t w i th o u r previ ous
￿n din g s, UK and F rance rat i os a re substan t i all y lo w e r than for the other m e t rop ol itan coun tr i es,
suggest i ng t h a t the stro n g er gr o wt h p erfo rmance of form e r Bri t i sh a n d F ren c h col onie s ma y i ndee d
b e l ink ed to li mited enforcemen t. Thi s concl usi o n do es n o t d en y the p ot en ti a l rel ev a n ce of other
economi c mec h a n isms or of p urel y i nst i tutional c hann els, b ut common wi sdom suggest s t h a t t he se
feat u res w oul d ten d to b e h ighl y correlated wi th the de g ree o f e nfor c emen t.
T h e p a ttern o f the o ther ma c r o e conom i c and so ciop o l i t i cal v a ri a b les along t h e metrop ol itan
rul er di mensi o n is il lu st rat e d i n T abl e 5. O ur concl usi o n s ar e st ren g h tene d b y the f act that Briti sh
and F ren c h col o ni es d ispl a y hi g h er le v e ls of the i n v estm e n t - o utpu t r atio, h uman capi t al and p oli tical
righ ts than ot h er coloni es.
4.1. 3 Econo m i c p enetrati on
In T a b le 6, w e analyze g ro w th rat e s once w e gro u p coloni es accordin g to t he degr e o f economi c
p enetra ti o n whi c h w e measure b y t h e d iscrep a n cy b et w ee n GDP and G N P i n 1960 . Su c h d iscrep -
ancy r e ￿ects rep a triated pro￿ts on forei g n i n v e st men t, ro y a l tie s and di r e ct expl oitat i on a cti viti es
18
The OECD pro vi de s i nformati on a b out inv estmen t by the coun try of ori gi n, bu t onl y f rom 1970. A l onger seri es
for f o reig n di rect inv estmen ts i s a v ai l abl e f ro m th e I M F, bu t do es no t d is t i ng ui sh b y th e co un try o f ori gi n.
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that the metrop oli s exerted at , roug h ly , the en d o f the col onial p eri o d. W e c hose t h e ra ti o i n 19 60
b ecause for ma n y coun t ri es thi s i s t h e ￿rst y ea r for whi c h data is a v ai labl e and b e cause i t do es not
v ary in an y su bst an ti a l w a y for an y of t h e y ears b et w ee n 1960 and in dep ende nce for mos t coun tr i es.
W e constr u ct four \ p ene t ration" classes: in the ￿ r st class, t he ratio o f GNP to G DP is up to 0.9 4;
the last cl ass compri ses c o u n t ri es for wh ic h the r ati o is 0. 99 or a b o v e. The t abl e pro vi des evi denc e
supp or ti ng t he c o n j e cture t h a t t h e highe r the de g ree of economic p enetrat i on w as a t t h e b egi nni ng
of the sam p le , t h e l o w er t h e gro wth ra te o f GD P w as o v er the p erio d . F o r t h e sampl e 1 960-8 8,
col o n ies w i th l o w or no p enetrat i on had a n a v erag e gr o wt h ra te w h ic h w as up to four ti mes l a rger
than the a v erag e gr o wt h rat e o f coun tr i es wi th hi gher l ev el of p e netra ti o n . Al so , consi st en t wi th
the resul ts o f T abl e 2, d ep en denc ies e xp eri ence d a lo w er a v e r age l ev el of p enetra ti o n t h a n co l oni es
(2 % vs. 4.5 %). The pattern i s substa n ti a l l y con￿rmed f or the l ast t h r e e subsampl es, whi le in t h e
subsampl e 1 960 - 7 3 t he rel a ti onshi p i s u ncl ear . Tw o w arni ngs ar e i n order. First, it w as d uring t h e
p erio d 1 960 - 7 3 that m ost coun tries c h a n g e d thei r p oli tic a l sta tus and , i n som e cases, en tered phases
of p ol iti cal and economic t u r moi l. S econd, t he fa c t that oil -pro du cin g coun t ri es suc h a s G ab on a n d
Cam e r o on b elong t o t h e h ighest-p enetrat i on c lass, b ec a u s e of the l ar ge out￿o w o f ro y alti es, ma y
part i all y exp lai n wh y the resul ts fo r thi s subsampl e are mi xed.
As b efore, ev en t h o ugh the economic si gni ￿cance of these d i￿erence s i s substan t i al, g ro wt h rates
of GDP p er-capi t a do not stat i stical ly di ￿ e r acro ss cl a sses i n al l of the sa mp les. Fi nall y , t he cross
secti o n a l c o rrel a ti o n b et w een a v erag e gro wth and t h e l og o f in iti a l cond iti o n s i s w e a k a s is t h e
rel a ti o n ship b et w een le v el of p ene t rat i on and ot h er macro economic a n d so ci op ol iti cal v ar i abl es of
i n t ere s t.
4.1. 4 Sum m ary
There are i n teresting h et e r ogene iti es i n the gro wth p a ttern of GD P p er-capi ta a l ong t h e di mensi ons
w e examine , and economic a l ly si gni ￿can t d i￿erenc es emerg e w h en consi deri ng a l l t h r e e \coloni a l "
cl as si ￿cati o n s . Ho w e v e r , si nce st and a rd d evi a ti o n s t e nd to b e larg e , fo rmal t ests are unabl e to
detec t stat i stical ly s i gni ￿can t di ￿ eren ces.
T h ere app ear to b e minor di ￿ erenc es b et w ee n the resul ts obtaine d in the ful l sa mp le and i n
the p ost - ind ep e nden ce s ampl e, suggestin g tha t, i f c o l oni a l rul e had an i m p a c t , i t ma y ha v e not
i mm e diatel y v anish ed with t h e g ai n o f p ol iti cal i ndep end ence. Al s o, the mean g ro wt h rat e of
GD P p e r - capita b y cl asses sho w ti me i nstabil i t i es whi c h c o u ld b e asso ci at ed wi t h the en d of t h e
col o n ization era . In part i cu lar, o v er the last subsampl e, GD P p er-capi ta gr o wt h ra tes a re m u c h
mor e uni for m across subgroups then in t h e ￿rst subsampl e.
M acro economi c and so ci op ol itic a l in dic a tors though t to b e asso ci a ted wi t h gro wth are also
cl early li nk ed to our cl a ssi ￿cations. F or exam p le , t h e in v estmen t - o u t pu t rat i o and sc ho ol att ai nmen t
w ere hi gher fo r d ep e nden cie s a n d for British a n d F renc h co l oni es. Therefore, t h e asso ciation b et w ee n
these v ariabl es and GD P g ro w th ma y i n f act b e d ue to the coloni al st atus of the Afr i can c o n ti nen t
20
.
4.2 Me a suri ng the ga i ns from d e coloni za t ion
The p r o c ess o f e conom i c d ecoloni zation i n man y Briti sh col o n ies b egan as ear l y as in t h e aft ermath
of WWI and w as a l mos t comple t e d b y the end of W WI I. Ho w e v e r , i t i s onl y i n 19 57 w i th t he i nde -
p enden ce o f Gha n a that w e can o￿cial ly mar k the b egi nni ng of t h e e r a o f p ol iti cal in dep ende nce.
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In an a ttempt to exami ne wheth er th ere w a s a li nk b et w een the le ngth of col oni al rul e and g ro w th w e hav e als o
tabu la ted gro wth rates on the b asi s of the l ength o f the c olo ni al ru le a nd th e date of i ndep ende nce. W e fou nd n o
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By 196 0, 22 of the 38 co l oni es of our sampl e w e r e p oli tic a l l y ind ep e nden t. Wi t h t h e coll apse of t h e
P o rtuguese empi r e in t h e mi d-Sev en ti es the pro ce ss r e a c h ed i t s end.
T h e e conom i c conseque nces o f dec o l oni zat i on are di ￿ c ul t t o measure. First, p ol itic a l a n d
economi c i nde p en denc e rarely coin ci ded. F or some coun tr i es, the pro cess o f economic dec o l oni zat i on
sta rted l ong b efore the en d of p oli tic a l domin a ti o n . F or o thers, the hi gh de g ree o f en f orceme n t of
di rect in v estmen t a n d tra de p ersi st e d l o n g after p ol itic a l domi nat i on end ed. Second, accordi ng
to historians there a p p eared t o b e l ittle economic r ational it y on the p a rt of the col oniz ers b eh in d
the dec isi on t o l ib erat e Afri ca
2 1
. Mo st coloni es w ere set free whe n they w e r e economical ly more
dynami c that in a n y p eri o d si nce 1920 , hi n t i ng that the mo ti v e fo r d ecoloni zation w as ma i nl y
p o l iti cal. The relativ e viol ence of the li b era ti o n pro cess a l so has t o b e t ak en in to accoun t whe n
tr yi ng t o ev al uat e i t s economic consequ ences. D e spite t h ese di￿c ulti es, w e a ttempt to measure t h e
ga i ns from dec o l oni zat i on b y exami nin g t h e gro wt h patt ern exp e r i en ced b y co l oni es i n the y ears
b efo re and af ter p oli t i cal in dep ende nce.
Sin ce d a ta on GDP p e r - ca p ita for ma n y co u n t ri es onl y sta rts i n 196 0, w e ar e fo rce d to drop
almost a l l coun tries wh ic h a cqu ired in dep ende nce b efore 19 60 fro m the sa mp le. Mor e o v er, to
mak e com p a ri so n s meanin g fu l, w e requi re data to exi st for six y ears b e fo re i nd ep en denc e, so that
the sam p le i s r e duce d ev e n mo re. In the en d w e w ere le ft with 18 c o u n t ri es ( An g ol a , B o tsw ana,
Cap o V e r d e, G am bi a , Gui nea Bi ssau, Ken y a, Lesotho, Mala wi, Mauriti us, M oro cco, Mo z a m bi que,
Ni g e r i a, Sw azi l a n d, South Afric a , Uganda, Za i re, Za m bi a, Zi m b a b w e ) 5 of whi c h w ere de p en denci es.
T o quan t i fy the e ￿ ec t s of d ecoloni zation, w e b egi n b y c o mpu t i ng the a v erag e g ro wt h ra tes for
si x y ear s b efore and aft er in dep e nden ce for eac h coun tr y; then w e calc ulate the cross sectional
a v erage gro wth ra te in the 12 y ears surroundi ng in dep e nden ce; a nd ￿ nall y , w e as se s s the presenc e
of a str u ctura l break in the mean gro wth pat tern aft e r i nde p en dence usin g the cross-sectional
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where t = 0 is i ndep ende nce time. W e constr u ct esti ma tes of ￿
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0; 1; : : : ; 4 u s i ng simp le recu rs i v e predi cti o n form u las based on the in fo rmat i on v ariabl e at t = 0.
W e all o w the i n t erce pt to b e coun try-sp e ci￿ c, si nce forci ng h o mogenei t y creates heteros k ed a sti cit y
i n the resid uals. W i th thi s set-u p resi dual s do n o t d ispl a y an y si g n i￿c a n t d evi a ti o n fro m t h e whi te
noi se ass u mption.
T a b le 7 ￿rst p resen ts the si x coun tr i es of t h e sa mpl e for wh ic h stat i st i cal ly si g n i￿ can t gro wth
di ￿ e r e nces b et w een the pre-i ndep end ence and p ost - ind ep e nden ce sam p le s e xist. Notice t h a t i n
all cases the r e is at l east a 4% di ￿erence in t h e gro wth rat e a c r oss sub p eri o ds. Al s o, four out
of si x coun t ri es w e r e actuall y dep ende nci es sugg esti ng that d ep e nden cie s w ere capabl e of t aki ng
maxim um adv a n tag e o f t he new p o l i t i cal o rd er.
Ov er t he cro ss secti o n , the a v e r age gro wt h r ates fo r the 12 y ears surr oun di ng i nd ep en denc e
di spl a y in terestin g fea tures. First, in the t hree y ears b e f ore in dep e nden ce the a v erage gro wth rate
of G DP p er-c a p ita w as negat i v e, i ndi cat i ng that con￿ icts for p oli t i cal ind ep e nden ce ma y ha v e
temp orar i l y h a mp ered gro wth. Sec o n d, a fter i ndep end ence, gro wth ra tes w ere all p ositi v e a n d
i ncreasin g , p e a ki ng a t a b out 6% i n the sixth y e a r af ter in dep ende nce. Thi rd, t h ere is a de cli ni ng
cross sectional v ariabi l it y of g ro w th r ates aft e r ind ep e nden ce, with a tro u g h in t h e thi r d y ea r.
F i gure 1 p resen ts the me a n forecasts at t = 0; 1 : : : ; 4 t ogether with the actual c r oss sectional
a v erages at e a c h p o i n t i n t i me. It i s cle a r t h a t t h e mo d el fail s out-of-sam p le de spite the fa ct t h a t t h e
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i n-sample ￿t of i s satisfactor y ( adju s ted R
2
i s of the o rde r of 0. 95) . Stat i stical forecast i ng measures -
suc h as the me a n squar e err or and the mea n abso l ute d eviation - con￿rm the prese nce of a st ru ct u r al
break in the gr o wt h p a ttern o f these coun tr i es at i ndep ende nce, as the y are large rel at i v e t o t h e
cross s e ctional v ar i abi li t y . F i gure 1 cle a rl y sho ws that , o n a v era ge, t he a c t ual mean g ro wt h rate
exce eded f orecasted one b y 1-2% p ercen ta ge p oin ts, uni fo rml y o v er the four fo rec a sti ng hor i zons, a
p ercen ta ge whi c h i s l arg e i n economic terms , g i v en the a v erag e GD P p e r - capita of t he se c o u n t ri es
at i ndep end ence . On the ot h er h a n d, t h ese r e sults ha v e to b e t ak en with care, b ec a u se the mo de l’s
for e cas ts re￿e ct, i n p a rt, t h e negat i v e gro wth rep o rted i n the t h r e e y ear s b efore i ndep end ence.
In concl usi o n , a t least for the coun trie s i n t hi s r e st ri cted s u bsample , t h ere i s a signi ￿can t
str u ctura l break i n t he gro wth pat tern a t in dep enden ce, wi t h p o st-i ndep end ence gro wth rates
exce edi ng pre- ind ep e nden ce a n d forecasted p ost - ind ep e nden ce g ro w th ra tes, an accel erat i on o f t h e
gro wth rat e with a p eak 4-6 y ear s a fter i ndep end ence a n d a rel at i v e de cli ne o f t h e cross sectional
v ari a b il it y of t h e di str i bu t i on of g ro wt h r ates of GD P p er-capi ta .
4.3 R egre s si ons
The anal y si s of se ct i on 4. 1 suggest e d t h a t coloni al h istor y ma y h a v e b e en i mp ort an t in d et e r mi ni ng
the gro wth rate of GD P a n d the lev el of the v ariabl es t ypi call y used to expl ain t h e cross-sectional
di st ri buti o n of a v e r age g ro w th ra tes a c r oss c o u n t ri es. Ho w ev er, the resul ts w e r e based on a bi v ariate
analysi s. T o v eri fy the h yp ot h esis t hat col o n ial hi st ory i s i ndee d a cand id a te t hi rd factor resp onsi bl e
for the c o mo v e men t s of these v a ri a b le s , w e run simpl e gro wth regr e s si ons addi ng pro xi es for c o l onial
heri ta ge to standard v ariabl es, and e xa mi ne (i) whether they ha v e s i gni ￿can t e xpl a nator y p o w er
for t h e a v erage gr o wt h ra te of GDP p er-c a p ita, a nd (ii ) whether they a￿ect the exp lanato ry p o w er
of some of the st and a rd v ariabl es. T o thi s end , in T abl e 9 w e presen t 3 regressions fo r eac h sampl e












is the a v e r age gr o wt h r ate of G DP p e r - ca p ita o f coun try i i n the sampl e, x
i
i s a se t of
\cor e " v ariabl es and D
i
are du mm i es c a p t uri ng col o n ial heri t age.
W e e xp eri men t e d wi th man y com b inations of the core v ariabl es, l eadi ng t o a to tal of more
than 100 reg ressi ons. F or reaso n s of space, w e sel ected t h e com bi nat i on of ec o nomi c, p ol iti cal a n d
ethni c v ari a bl es whi c h ha s the b e st expl anat ory p o w er fo r the a v erag e gro wth o f GD P p e r - capita
of Af ri can nations for the e n t i re p e r i o d. F or this regression, x
i
i ncl ude s a constan t , the l o g of GDP
p er-capita at the b egi nni ng o f the sa mpl e (l o g Y
0
), the squ a red log G DP p er-capi t a at the b egi nni ng
of the sampl e (l o g Y
2
0
) , the i n v e st men t-output r atio (I/Y) , t h e p ercen tage of w orkin g age p opul at i on
i n secondary sc h o o l (Sc ho ol), the i nde x o f ethni c fra c t i onali zat i on (F ract), the i ndex of p oli tical
righ ts (Pri g h t) and a dumm y for o i l p r o d uci ng c o u n t ri es ( O il ) (regr e ss i on R1). Al l regressor s are
measured i n 1960 e xcept for Pr i gh t w h ic h is an a v era ge o v er the 196 0-64 p e r i o d.
T h e squar e of t h e in iti a l condi t i on i s use d here to accoun t fo r non-l i neariti es i n the rel a ti onshi p
and ma y hel p t o detect the prese nce of a p olariz a ti o n ph enomenon whic h cl early app ea rs in Afri can
data ( see a l so East erl y and L evi ne (19 94)) . The o i l dumm y i s used t o accoun t for t h e l ik el y
di ￿ e r e n t i al gro wth patt erns of oil vs. non-oi l coun trie s. W e do not di rectl y co n sid er the i nd ex
of p oli tic a l in st abi l it y here b e cause, for the c o u n t ri es o f our sam p le , it is h ighl y coll i near wi th
i ncl uded v ar i abl es ( see T abl e 8 for si mpl e pairwi se c o rrel at i ons) . R egressions substi t u t i ng t h e i nd ex
of p oli tic a l righ ts wi th t h e pro xy for mark et d istor ti o n s (Pi dev) g a v e substan ti all y simi lar resul t s,
whi c h w e d o not r e p ort . T o t h is \b est" r e g ressi on w e add a n um b er of i nd icator s for c o l onial
heri ta ge. Once ag ai n w e h a v e e xp eri men ted wi t h sev eral com bi nation o f co l oni a l v ar i abl es, gi v e n4 A S UM MAR Y OF THE R ESUL T S 12
the set of cor e v ar i abl es. W e rep o rt o n ly t w o addi tional regressi o n s. I n r e g ressi o n R 2 D
i
captures
di ￿ e r e nces in the p oli tical stat us a n d i n t h e metrop oli ta n rul er: D DEP i s a dumm y for dep ende nci es
and DFR i s a dumm y f or col o n ies whi c h h a d F r anc e a s me t rop ol itan rul er
2 2
. In r e g ressi on R3 w e
add t o p r e v i ous regressor s t w o o the r dummi es measurin g cl a sses o f GNP/GD P r atio i n 1 960: DR1
(hi g h est p en et ration) has the v alu e of t h e GNP/G DP rat i o if it i s le ss t h en or equal to 0 .94 a n d
zero otherwise, w h il e DR 4 ( l o w est p e netra ti o n ) has t h e v a l ue o f the G N P /GDP ra ti o if i t i s g reater
than 0 .99 and zero otherwise . W e use dummi es for the l ev el of p enetrat i on ( as opp osed t o t h e l ev el
i t sel f ) b ecause o f the p oten t i al nonli near e￿ects that t he siz e of t h e GNP/ GDP ra ti o ma y ha v e
had o n gro wth, e￿ects whi c h w oul d ha v e b ee n ne g l ected had w e used the GNP/GD P r atio direc t l y .
Si nce w e use expl a n a tory v ari a bl es dat ed i n 196 0 or cal cul at ed as a v erages o v er t he 19 60-64 p e r i o d,
end o gen eit y p r obl ems are li k e ly t o b e minor. In fa ct, i n a reg ressi on of the a v erage gro wth rate of
GD P p e r -c a p ita from 19 65 to 198 8 (as opp os e d to 196 0) on t h ese v ar i abl es, no qu a l i t ativ e c hanges
o ccu r red .
4.3. 1 The 1960-8 8 sam ple
F or the 1 960 - 8 8 sa mpl e st and a rd v ariabl es a re signi ￿c a n t at the 10 % le v e l a n d wi th the righ t si gn
i n R 1 , e xcept for the h u ma n capi t al pro xy whi c h i s i nsigni ￿c a n t (as i t is i n a l l regressions that
i ncl ude the in v estmen t rat i o) . All o ther thin g s b e in g equal , a v erage gro wth is hi gher the l o w er
are i ni tial cond iti o n s and the in dex of ethni c fra c t i onali zat i on, and the hi gher a re the in v estmen t-
output ratio, the h uma n capi ta l lev el a n d the i ndex of p o l i t i cal righ ts. Co n diti o n a l con v ergenc e
i s fas t (at a rat e o f 1 9%). The oil du m m y i s al so signi ￿can tly p ositi v e as i s the squ a re o f t h e
i ni t i al condi t i ons, in di cat i ng the prese nce o f p ol ar i zation in the i ncome d istrib ution in Afri can
coun tries. The dummi es for de p en denci es a n d for F renc h col o n ies is p osi t i v e and signi ￿can t i n R2
and R 3 sugg e st i ng, other thi ngs b e in g e qual, that b ei ng a dep ende ncy of the U K or a colon y of
F ra n ce pro vi ded a gro wt h ed g e o v er o ther coun tr i es in Afric a . These t w o dummi es are so mewhat
correlated wi t h I/Y, the sc h o o l i ng v ariabl e and the i nd ex o f e t hn ic f ractional iz a ti o n , w h ic h are l ess
si g n i￿c a n t in R 2 than in R 1. Al so, the si ze of the co e￿ci en ts o f the in iti a l condi t i on is robust to
the i nc lusi on of d ummies fo r p oli tical sta tus con￿rmin g t h a t p oli tical sta tus is p redetermin ed wi th
resp e ct to GDP g ro w th. The t w o p e netra ti o n d ummies are not si g n i￿c a n t in R 3, b ut the ir presenc e
raises t h e e xplanator y p o w e r of the regr e s si on ( the adjusted R
2
is 0 .62 aga i nst the 0. 49 of the basi c
regression). S in ce the co e￿c ien t of b ot h du mm i es is p ositi v e , Afric a n coun tries whi c h had ei t h er a
v ery hi gh or a v ery l o w G N P /GDP ra ti o di d c o mparat i v el y b e t ter i n t h e con tin en t , s trengh teni ng
the i dea that t h ere ma y b e a n o nl i near rel a ti o n s h ip b et w e en ec o n o mi c p enetrat i on and gro wth.
4.3. 2 The I ndep endence- 1988 sa m pl e
F or t h e sam p le t h a t go es from in dep enden ce to 19 88 the resul ts ar e simi lar. Therefore, w e onl y
hi ghli gh t the most i m p or tan t features. In the basic regression, the i n v est me n t -outpu t ra ti o b ecomes
mor e si gni￿ can t , i ndi cat i ng t h a t t h ere m a y ha v e b e en a de la y e d e￿ e ct of thi s v ariabl e o n gro wth,
whi le t h e i niti al cond iti o n and the i ni tial condi t i on squared loses si g n i￿ ca n ce.
T h e dummi es fo r de p en denci es and for F r anc e a s metrop oli ta n r u le r are stil l si gni￿ can t whi l e
the i n v e st men t-output rat i o, t h e h uman capi t al v ariabl e and the ind ex of et h ni c fr acti o n a l i zat i on
are less si g n i￿ can t i n R2 than in R 1. The t w o d ummie s for p en etr ation cl asses a re n o t signi ￿can t




A du mm y for Bri tish col oni es w as n ot used si nce most o f i ts i mpact i s al read y cap tured by DD EP , wi th whi c h i t
i s hi ghl y correl ated.4 A S UM MAR Y OF THE R ESUL T S 13
the l ast r e g ressi o n i s sma l l er t o that of R2, suggesting that the e ￿ ects of the p ene t ration v ar i abl e
w ere l ik el y to b e i mp orta n t, i f e v er, o n ly in the y ears p r e cedi ng p oli t i cal i ndep end ence. Ho w ev er,
the b ene ￿ci a l e ￿ ects of h a vi ng b e en a F ren c h col o n y o r a B r i tish dep end ency d id not v ani sh wi th
p o l iti cal ind ep e nden ce.
4.3. 3 The 1960-7 3 subs a m p le
The sub sa mpl e 196 0-73 c a n b e vi ew e d as the one that m ore cl os e ly capture the l as t phase of t h e
col o n ial era and t he a sso ci at e d economi c a n d p ol iti cal turmoil . Tw o main fea tures e m e r ge from t h e
basi c regressi o n . F i rst , onl y t h e i n v est me n t -outpu t ra ti o i s si g n i￿ ca n t a mong t h e c o re v ariabl es.
Sec o n d, and as a consequen ce of t h e ab o v e , t h e expl anat ory p o w er of the cross sectional r e g ressi ons
i s v e r y lo w, m uc h l o w er than i n the previ o u s t w o sampl es.
T h e d umm y fo r dep enden ci es i s stil l si g n i￿c a n t whe n add ed to the core v a ri able s, whil e t h e
du m m y for F renc h col o n ies is not probably b e cause i n t h ese c o un tri es the p ol iti ca l u nrest and t h e
destructi o n s caused b y the di ￿ c ul t pro cess of p o l i t i cal i ndep end ence ma y h a v e temp o raril y wi p e d
out the b e ne￿c ial gro wth e ￿ ec t s o f b e ing a F renc h colon y . In R2 t h e si gni ￿cance of the in v estmen t-
output ra ti o dro p s r e lativ e to t h e basel in e case, as a c o n sequenc e of t h e hi g h cor re lation wi t h t h e
dep end ency d umm y .
Addi ng t h e p ene t ration dummi es in creases the e xplanator y p o w er, but t h e imp r o v emen t i s
rel a ti v e : for thi s su bsa mp le ha vin g a l o w G NP/GDP rat i o w as go o d f or g ro w th, so that the m o d -
erni zat i on e￿ect of col o n ial in v estmen t o u t w eigh ted the negat i v e e￿ect.
4.3. 4 The 1974-8 0 subs a m p le
F or the 74-80 su bsam p le t he cor e re g ressi o n is aga i n di sapp o i n ting, at l east from t h e v an ta ge p oin t
of neo cl assic a l gro wth theory , wi t h in signi ￿can t co e￿ci en ts for t h e i ni t i al c o n diti on and al l t h e
ot h er st and a rd v ariabl es, excep t for the i nde x o f e t h ni c fra cti ona l i zat i on.
T h e du m mi es for dep ende nci es and for F ra n ce as metro p o l i t an r u ler are p o si tiv e and signi ￿can t
i n R2, bu t app ear t o b e un co rrel at ed with other v a ri a b les in the equation. Addi ng the p enetrat i on
du m mi es do e s not c hange the o v e r al l pi ct u r e ; all the v ariabl es whi c h w ere p r e viousl y signi ￿can t are
stil l so and the adjusted R
2
i s unc h a n g ed .
4.3. 5 The 1981-8 8 subs a m p le
In t h is su bsa mp le t he in iti a l condi tions and t h e i niti al cond iti o n s squar e d ar e t h e v ari a b les wi th
the l a rgest expl anat ory p o w er and the ind ex of p oli tical righ ts is the onl y o the r si gni ￿can t v ar i abl e
i n R 1 . N o ne of t h e col o n ial dummi es i s si g n i￿c a n t, in dic a ti ng that the in ￿uen ce of col o n ial rul e
ma y h a v e faded i n the l ast de cade on the sampl e. On t h e ot h er ha n d, b e ca u se st and a rd v ar i abl es
ha v e l i t tl e e xplanator y p o w er further r e sear c h i n t o t h e ca u ses of t h e n ega ti v e gro wth p erform anc e
of t hi s p erio d of African h istor y i n ne eded
2 3
. Notice a l so t hat t h e t w o p ene t ration du mm i es are
somewhat c o rrel a ted with the h uma n capi t al v ariabl e for thi s sa mpl e.
4.3. 6 Sum m ary
There are se v eral i n terest i ng resul t s whi c h e merg e from our r e g ressi on a n a l ysis. First, our pro xi es
for coloni al h eritag e ar e signi ￿c a n t and a d d sub st an tial expl anat ory p o w er i n cross-sectional gro wth
regressions fo r t h e r e lev an t sam p le s : thei r i n￿ uence i s stronger i n t h e ￿rs t subsampl e and sl o wl y
23
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fades a s time prog resses. S econd, v ari a b les pro xyi ng f or co l oni a l heri t age app ear to b e cor rel at e d
with the in v estmen t - o u t pu t ratio, et h ni c fr acti o n a l i zat i on and h uman capi ta l accum ul at i on, a n d
dri v e the signi ￿canc e of t he se v ar i abl es d o wn w h en t h ey are jo i n tly in clu ded i n the regressions.
Thi rd, v ariabl es pro xyi ng fo r coloni al he ritag e are le ss si gni￿ can t and l ess cor rel at e d with core
v ari a b les i n t h e p ost i ndep ende nce sample . These three fact s ta k en tog e t h er suggest that c o l o-
ni al h eritag e ma y i nd eed h a v e b een a n imp or tan t ( exogenous) thi rd fact or causi ng cross-sectional
como v emen ts of g ro w th rates and of v ariabl es t ypic a l l y used to expl ain t he m a n d that c o l onial
i n￿ue nce faded som e w h a t sl o wl y af ter Afri can coun trie s r e a c h ed p o l i t i cal in dep e nden ce.
A t the same time , our a n a l ysis demonstr ates that, a t l east for Africa, there i s si gni ￿can t in -
sta b il it y in t h e fa c t ors a ￿ecti ng gro wth o v e r ti me. The i n v e st men t-output rat i o i s si g n i￿c a n t i n
the 1 960-73 subsampl e, the i ndex of ethn ic fra c t i onali zation is signi ￿can t i n the 1 974-8 0 subsampl e
and t he i ndex o f p ol itic a l ri gh ts i s si gni￿ can t in the 1981 -88 sub sa mpl e. Thi s in st abi l it y den ies t h e
exi st e nce of a si ngle \cause" for A f ri ca’ s p o or gro wth p erforma n ce o v er the last thi rt y y e a rs a n d
suggest s t h a t d i￿eren t v a ri a b les ma tter for di ￿ eren t stages of dev el opmen t. I n the in itial stag e in -
v estm e n t in ph ysi cal capital app e a rs to b e the mo st i mp orta n t factor , whi le later on h u ma n capi t al
accum ul at i on and p oli t i cal righ ts b ecome c r u cial fo r gro wth. In g e neral, these ￿n di ngs o p en i n ter-
estin g a v e n ues fo r researc h a ttemptin g to acc o u n t for thi s sequen ti a l pro cess, b oth a t the empi rical
and the t h eor e t i cal lev el s.
4.4 Can w e ex p l ain the signi ￿ c a nce of the Africa dum m y ?
Ha ving i den ti ￿ed those c o l oni a l v ari a b les wh ic h app ear t o b e i mp ort an t in expl ain ing Afri ca’ s cross
secti o n a l gro wt h pat tern, w e w o u ld li k e t o kno w if they are also i mp ort an t in expl a i ni ng Afric a ’s
gro wth p erf ormance rel at i v e to that o f other c o n ti nen ts. In o the r w ords, w e w oul d l ik e t o kn o w
whether the in clu sion of v a ri a b le s de s c r i bi ng t h e metrop ol itan r u ler, the p ol itic a l st atus o r t h e
economi c p en etr ation exp eri enced b y Afri can coun tr i es i s s u ￿cie n t to d r i v e a w a y the i mp ort anc e
of a sub-Saharan du mm y i n regressi o n s inc lu din g co u n t ri es from t he en tire w orld.
T o c hec k whethe r thi s i s t h e c a se , w e ￿rst rep li cate B a rro’ s (1 991) resul t s (regr e s si ons 2 9)
usi ng o u r d a ta set , and t h en sho w the e￿ects of i nc lud in g our pro xi es for c o l oni a l heri t age i n t h e
regressions. Noti ce that out of t h e 98 coun tries in t h e sampl e, 3 0 b el ong to t he Afric a n con t i ne n t .
The addi t i onal v a ri a b les app ea ri ng in these regressions a re from Barro and Lee (19 94b). Sin ce t h e
rel a ti o n ship b et w een the p ene t ration v ariabl e and gro wth app ear to b e li ne a r, w e presen t resu lts
en teri ng d irec t l y t h e G DP/GNP ratio i n t o the regressions. Al so, t o capture the un u sual features
of the Afri can coloni al exp erie nce, t he d umm y for F rance as metr op o l i t an rul er and t he one for
Bri t i sh d ep en denc ies a re se lec t e d to ha v e n o n zero v al ues onl y if t he coun tr y b el onged to the Afri can
con tine n t . In o ther w o rd s , w e do not a ssi gn a n y sp eci a l sta tus to F renc h co l oni es, sa y , in A s i a, si nce,
as w e arg u ed i n S ection 3 , t he y ma y ha v e b een sub jected t o d i￿eren t gui del in es than Afri can ones.
The resu lts ar e presen ted i n T abl e 10 . In t h e ￿rst r e g ressi o n ( c a l l ed Basi c) , and consi sten t wi th
Barro ’s evi dence , w e ￿n d v e r y sl o w con v ergence (1. 4% a y ear). The si ze of the go v e r n m e n t sec t or
rel a ti v e t o GDP , t h e in v estmen t-output ra ti o a n d the fertil i t y rat e a re signi ￿can t and wi t h t h e
righ t si gn, wh il e h uma n capi ta l , t h e magni t ud e o f ma rk et p r i ce di st ortions a n d p oli tic a l v ar i abl es
are i nsi g n i￿ can t . B o th the Lat i n Americ a and the Afr i ca dummie s are n ega ti v e , ev en though t h e
si ze of the co e ￿ c ien t on the Latin America du mm y i s small er and l ess si gni￿ can t .
Addi ng col o n ial du m mi es mak es the co e￿ci en t of the Africa dumm y l ess negativ e a nd l ess
si g n i￿c a n t, whi l e the co e￿ci en t of the Lati n Ameri ca du mm y r e ma i ns s tabl e (V ari a n t 1). T h e
b eha vi or of all other v a ri a b le s is unc hanged : those w h ic h w e r e signi ￿can t and t h o se whi c h w ere not
remain so. In V ar i an t 2 w e mai n t ai n our c o l oni a l dummi es a n d excl ude the A f ri ca dumm y f rom5 CONCL USIO N 15
the regr e ssions. W e w oul d l ik e to kno w whe t h er the e xplanator y p o w er of the reg ressi ons a n d t h e
co e￿ci en t on ot h er v ar i abl es ar e c h a n g e d. Al though one of t he coloni al du m mi es i s not si g n i￿ can t ,
w e do ￿n d that t h e adjusted R
2
and the co e￿ci en ts on ot h er v ariabl es are u naltered. He nce,
col o n ial past and t h e p ecul iari t i es of Afric a ’s un derdev el opmen t a p p ear to b e highl y correlated.
5 Concl usi o n
In thi s pa p er w e ha v e p ro vi ded a se t of st yli zed facts conc ernin g the i m p a c t of col onial ru le on t h e
gro wth rat e of GD P p e r - ca p ita i n Af ri can co u n t ri es and at tempted to v erify so me o f the h yp ot h eses
pu t forw ard i n Berto cc hi ( 1994 ). W e argued that t h e c hoic e o f Afri ca a s the fo cu s o f our analysi s
i s di ctat e d b y i mp ort an t h istor i cal consi derations, but that at t he same t i me t h e lac k o f adequate
data i mp osed s e v e r e const rai n t s on the t yp e of i n v e s ti g ation w e w ere abl e t o un derta k e. W e also
arg u ed t h a t som e of t h e v ariabl es used i n st and a rd gro wth regr e s si ons a re en dog e nous and that
thei r cro ss se ct i onal pro p erties ma y i ndeed b e t h e resul t o f e conom i c c o l oni zat i on.
Our i n v esti g ation sh o ws t h a t the i mpact of col o n ization on gro wth i n Africa w a s, on a v era ge,
negativ e. W e ￿n d ec o n o mi call y si gni ￿can t di ￿ eren ces i n t h e a v e r age gro wth rates once w e gro u p
coun tries a c co rd ing to the p oli tical sta tus, t h e metro p oli ta n rule r a n d the degree of economi c
p enetra ti o n e xp eri ence d u nder col o ni al rul e: dep end enci es do b ett e r than coloni es, Briti sh a n d
F renc h coloni es do b ett er t h a n P or tuguese and Itali an one s , and l o w-p enetrat i on c o u n t ri es d o b etter
than hi g h -p en etr ation ones. Mo re o v er, w e sho w that i mp orta n t ma c r o e co n o mi c and so ci o p oli tical
v ari a b les co mmonl y used t o e xplai n cross-secti o n a l di ￿ e r e nces i n gro wth rates di spl a y i mp ort an t
heterogenei ties asso ci a ted wi th coloni al hi sto ry . W e a l so d etect t i me i nst abi l iti es a c r oss subsampl es
whi c h co u ld b e rel ated, to som e exten t, with the end of the col o ni zation era. The regression analysi s
demonstra tes that v a ri a b les pro xyin g for col o n ial h eritag e are signi ￿can t in exp lai nin g the cross-
secti o n a l di st ri bution of a v era ge gro wth r ates. M oreo v er, st and a rd v a ri able s t ypi call y inc lud ed i n
gro wth reg ressi on (e. g., p r o xy meas u res f or h uman capi ta l , e t h nic div ersi t y , etc.) ar e cor rel at e d
with o ur measures of col o n ial heri t age and lose thei r expl anat ory p o w e r w h en they are joi n t l y
i ncl uded i n the regr e s si on. Fi nall y , w e sh o w t h a t v ariabl es capturing coloni al he r i ta ge accoun t
for t h e d i￿eren tial and n ega ti v e p erf ormance o f Afr i ca rel at i v e to ot h er con tine n t s a n d are h ighl y
correlated wi th the Su b-Sahara dumm y that other studi es ha v e used .REFERENCES 16
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Sv edb erg , P ., 19 81, Coloni al En fo rceme n t of F oreign D i rect In v estmen t, The Man ch e ster Scho ol
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T abl e 1 : S tatu s of the C ou n tri es in th e Samp l e
Coun try P ol iti c al Status M etrop oli tan Coun try Inde p ende nce
Alg e ria C F ranc e 196 2
Angol a C Po r tuga l 197 4
Be nin C F ranc e 196 0
Bots w a na D U K 196 6
Bu rki na F a s o C F ranc e 196 0
Bu rundi C B elgi um 196 2
Cam e ro on C F ranc e 196 0
Cap e V er de C Po r tuga l 197 5
Ce n t ral African R . C F ranc e 196 0
Chad C F ranc e 196 0
Congo C F ranc e 196 0
Egypt D U K 192 2
Eth i opi a I
Ga b o n C F ranc e 196 0
Ga m bi a C U K 196 5
Gha n a C U K 195 7
Gui ne a C F ranc e 195 8
Gui ne a- B i s sau C Po r tuga l 197 5
Iv ory Co ast C F ranc e 196 0
Ke n y a C U K 196 3
Les otho D U K 196 6
Lib eria I
Madag as car C F ranc e 196 0
Mal a wi C U K 196 4
Mal i C F ranc e 195 9
Mauritani a C F ranc e 196 0
Mauriti us C U K 196 8
Moro c co C F ranc e 195 6
Mozam bi que C Po r tuga l 197 5
Nig e r C F ranc e 196 0
Nig e ria C U K 196 0
Rw anda C B elgi um 196 2
Se negal C F ranc e 195 9
Se y chell e s C U K 197 6
Sierr a Le o ne C U K 196 1
Som ali a C It a ly 196 0
South Africa D U K 196 1
Sudan C U K 195 6
Sw azil and D U K 196 8
T a nz ani a C U K 196 4
T o go C F ranc e 196 0
T uni s i a C F ranc e 195 6
Uganda C U K 196 2
Zaire C B elgi um 196 0
Zam bi a C U K 196 4
Zim bab w e D U K 196 5
No t es: C s ta n ds fo r c ol on y , D for dep e ndenc i e s and I f or indep ende n t .T ABL ES 19
T abl e 2: Gro w t h R a t es b y P ol it ical St atus
Sam pl e V ari able Ov e ral l Co loni e s Dep ende ncies Ind ep e nden t
6 0-88 ￿Y 1 .12 0 0 .84 6 3 .28 0 -0 .13 9
( 1 .90 5) (1 .64 9) ( 2 .35 5) ( 1 .43 0)
Inde p-8 8 ￿Y 1 .36 0 1 .08 9 3 .52 6 0 .01 0
( 2 .73 0) (2 .66 0) ( 2 .74 7) ( 1 .24 2)
6 0-73 ￿Y 1 .96 5 1 .62 4 4 .35 1 1 .07 5
( 2 .20 3) (2 .03 1) ( 2 .10 3) ( 0 .79 0)
7 4-80 ￿Y 0 .53 2 0 .01 3 3 .93 3 0 .19 3
( 4 .51 9) (4 .60 9) ( 2 .98 5) ( 1 .21 7)
8 1-88 ￿Y -0 .54 7 -0 .33 3 - 1.3 27 -2 .26 8
( 4 .27 4) (4 .31 5) ( 4 .77 8) ( 2 .95 9)
Cross Secti on a l Corr elat io n Av er a g e Gr o wth- Log In it i a l Cond i ti ons
Sam pl e Ov e ral l Co loni e s Dep ende ncies Ind ep e nden t
6 0-88 -0. 14 0. 01 -0. 18 -0. 26
Inde p-8 8 -0. 05 0. 00 -0. 07 -0. 29
6 0-73 -0. 02 0. 06 -0. 06 -0. 23
7 4-80 0. 03 0. 03 -0. 05 -0. 24
8 1-88 -0. 40 -0. 34 -0. 23 0. 00
No t es: ￿Y is the a v erage gro wth rate of i nc o m e o v er the sam ple.
T ab le 3 : S tati st ics o f Ot her V a r iab le s b y P ol i ti cal S tatu s
V ari able Ov e ral l Co loni e s Dep ende ncies In dep e nden t
I = Y 13. 979 13. 045 19. 600 13. 450
S chool 2 .30 2 2 .06 1 3 .83 3 1 .80 0
P ol ins t 0 .08 0 0 .08 5 0 .03 8 0 .15 9
P r ig h t 5 .41 5 5 .52 3 4 .63 8 5 .69 4
F r act 61. 690 63. 428 43. 800 76. 000
P idev 0 .26 9 0 .30 8 0 .09 9 0 .06 8
No t es: I = Y i s the in v estm e n t - output ratio i n 19 60; S chool i s the p e rc en tage of th e w orking p opula tion
in s ec o ndary scho o l i n 19 60; P o l inst is a n index o f p ol iti c al i ns tabi li t y i n 196 0; P r ig ht i s an i nde x
of p oli tical righ ts o v e r t he p er i o d 19 60-6 4 and F r act is an index of et hni c fract i onal izatio n in 1960 .T ABL ES 20
T abl e 4: Gro wth R ate s b y Metr op ol i ta n Rul er
Sampl e V ari abl e F ran ce U .K. P ortuga l B elg iu m Ital y F ormer German
60-88 ￿Y 1.06 1 1.097 -0. 1 56 0.227 - 0 . 2 16 1.362
(1.83 6) (1.534) (1.514 ) (0.869) (0.698 )
Ind ep-88 ￿Y 1.47 4 1.385 -1. 2 09 1.026 0.038 2.006
(2.31 7) (1.828) (5.906 ) (1.544) (0.772 )
60-73 ￿Y 1.66 1 1.872 1.657 1.347 - 0 . 9 50 1.998
(2.35 8) (1.247) (2.852 ) (1.872) (2.353 )
74-80 ￿Y 1.01 8 -0.71 6 -3. 0 39 -0.863 5.452 2.827
(2.97 9) (5.132) (7.779 ) (5.936) (0.937 )
81-88 ￿Y -1.119 1.080 0.021 -0.962 - 2 . 7 37 - 1 . 2 83
(2.45 7) (6.493) (4.984 ) (1.431) (1.622 )
Cross Secti o n a l Correlation : A v era ge Gro wth - L og Ini ti a l Con di tion s
C o l oni es of
Sampl e F ran ce U .K. P ortuga l B elg iu m F ormer German
60-88 0.10 -0.05 -0.13 0 . 01 -0.20
Ind ep-88 0.11 0 . 0 5 -0.09 -0.18 -0.25
60-73 0.17 -0.12 0.05 -0.16 -0.24
74-80 -0.00 0 . 1 7 -0.11 0 . 00 -0.19
81-88 -0.28 -0.28 -0.02 0 . 13 0.03
Enf or c e m e n t Ra ti os in 1938
F ran ce U .K. P ortuga l B elg iu m Ital y
F orei gn Di rect
In v es t me n t 4 . 2 2.1 9 . 6 6.7 9.1
T ra de 2 . 7 2.2 29.8 1 0. 4 NA
N o t e s: ￿Y is the a v erage gro wth rate o f i ncome o v er t h e sa mpl e. En forcemen t ratio s are from S v edb erg (1 981).
T abl e 5: Stat i st i c s of Other V ar i abl es b y Metr op ol i ta n Rul er
V a riab le F rance U. K. P ortuga l Belg iu m Italy F or mer G erman
I = Y 13 . 70 1 14.980 5.950 6.506 13.800 11.860
S cho ol 2.094 2.400 1.259 1.466 1. 1 00 1. 5 20
P o l in st 0.058 0.107 NA 0.109 0. 2 00 0. 0 87
P r ig ht 5.669 4.782 6.361 6.074 6. 7 77 5. 8 66
F r act 61 . 77 7 77.181 71.500 36 . 0 00 8. 0 00 54.200
P ide v 0.339 0.022 0.255 1.355 -0.293 0. 2 71
N o t e s: I = Y i s th e i n vestmen t-outp ut ratio i n 196 0; S c hool i s the p erc en tage of w or kin g age p op ul ati on in
seco ndary sc ho o l i n 196 0; P ol inst i s an i nde x of p ol iti cal i nstabi l it y i n 1 960; P r ig ht i s an i ndex of p ol iti cal
ri gh ts o v er the p eri o d 1 960-64 and F r act i s an in dex of ethni c f ra ction al iza t i on i n 196 0. p e r w oman , P idev
the p rice of i n v estment i n 196 0 in d evi ati onT ABL ES 21
T abl e 6: Gr o wth Rates b y D egree o f Economi c P ene trat ion i n 19 60
GNP/G DP rati o
Sam pl e V ari able Le ss 0. 94 0. 94-0 .96 0.9 7-0. 99 G r eater 0 .99
6 0-88 ￿Y 0.6 97 0.3 87 0. 677 1. 266
(2.0 23) (1.7 72) (1. 363 ) (1. 513 )
Inde p-8 8 ￿Y 0.4 09 0.5 16 1. 053 1. 900
(3.9 71) (1.7 02) (1. 797 ) (2. 083 )
6 0-73 ￿Y 2.1 04 2.5 05 1. 522 0. 906
(2.7 20) (1.7 01) (1. 913 ) (1. 389 )
7 4-80 ￿Y -1. 268 -2.5 89 -0 .185 2. 239
(6.0 83) (3.6 50) (2. 792 ) (3. 908 )
8 1-88 ￿Y -1. 347 -0.2 65 -0 .062 0. 304
(3.3 08) (4.7 58) (2. 076 ) (6. 030 )
C r oss S ecti on a l Corre lat ion Av erage Gro w t h R a t e - L og Ini ti al C on di t ion s
Sam pl e Le ss 0. 94 0. 95-0 .97 0.9 8-1. 00 G r eater 1 .00
6 0-88 0 .06 -0 .12 -0. 17 0. 14
Inde p-8 8 -0 .01 -0 .06 -0. 18 0. 13
6 0-73 0 .25 -0 .12 -0. 22 0. 08
7 4-80 -0 .22 0 .17 -0. 05 0. 27
8 1-88 -0 .19 -0 .10 -0. 04 -0. 26
No t es: ￿Y i s t he a v e rag e gro wth rate of incom e o v e r the sam pl e . Classe s are c o ns truc ted using
GNP/G DP ratio in 19 60.T ABL ES 22
T abl e 7: St ati sti cs Bef ore an d Af ter I n depend ence
a ) T est of Equal it y of Av erage G ro w th Rate s
Coun tr y Gro wth R ate G r o wth Ra t e Signi ￿c ance
Be f ore Indep e nden ce After Inde p e ndenc e
South Africa 0.2 3 4 .46 0 .00
B otsw ana 2.2 0 11. 51 0 .05
Ca p o V er de -5. 98 8 .11 0 .06
Zim bab w e -1. 41 3 .16 0 .09
Lesotho 8.6 1 2 .36 0 .10
Mal a wi -0. 27 4 .99 0 .10
b) Cross S ecti on a l Mean G ro w t h Rat e Arou nd Ind ep end en c e
Y ear Me a n S ta n da r d De vi atio n
-6 1.8 9 7 .78
-5 4.3 2 6 .43
-4 0.8 6 5 .94
-3 -0. 14 5 .69
-2 -2. 42 10. 41
-1 -0. 43 8 .05
Inde p ende nce 1.1 1 8 .39
1 1.2 8 13. 64
2 2.8 2 8 .82
3 2.6 9 3 .55
4 3.6 6 6 .34
5 1.0 3 8 .13
6 6.2 4 9 .85
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T ab le 8: Corr el a t io n Matri x
V aria bles Scho o l I/ Y Po li ns t Prig h t F r act Pi de v DFR DDEP
I/Y 0. 23
P oli ns t 0. 00 -0. 14
Pr i gh t -0. 40 0.1 0 0. 37
F ract -0. 24 -0. 13 -0. 30 -0. 13
Pidev 0. 54 0.2 7 -0. 05 -0. 18 -0 .46
DFR -0. 32 0.0 2 -0. 24 0. 14 0 .21 -0.0 3
D DEP 0. 54 0.2 4 -0. 10 -0. 16 -0 .27 0.3 6 -0. 44
Drai n -0. 18 -0. 29 0. 36 -0. 15 -0 .31 -0.0 5 -0. 21 -0. 01
No t es: I/ Y re pres en ts the in v e stm en t - output ratio , Sc ho ol the p er ce n t a ge of w orki ng age p opula tion in
se condary scho o l, P ol inst an i n dex of p oli tical i ns ta bili t y , F ract a n index of ethnic fractional izati on,
al l in 196 0. Prig h t a n i nd ex of p ol itical ri gh ts fo r the 19 60-64 p er i o d. D FR is a dum m y fo r colo nies
with F rance as m et rop ol itan ruler and DD E P a dum m y f or British de p en denc i e s. Drain i s the
GNP/G DP ratio in 19 60.T ABL ES 23
T a b le 9: G r o wth Reg ress i ons











R1 70 . 74 -19.00 1.33 0.09 0. 1 7 -0.02 - 0 . 58 1 . 9 3 0. 4 9
(3.04) ( -2.68 ) (2.46) (2.69) (1. 0 0) (-2.82) (- 2 . 39 ) ( 2 . 6 2)
R2 82 . 20 -22.52 1.59 0.07 0. 1 0 -0.02 - 0 . 63 1.35 1.56 1 . 9 7 0. 6 0
(3.66) ( -3.31 ) (3.08) (2.35) (0. 7 0) (-2.54) (- 2 . 94 ) (2.99) (2.10) ( 3 . 0 2)
R3 77 . 03 -20.91 1.45 0.07 0. 0 9 -0.02 - 0 . 59 1.15 1.84 1 . 8 7 0 . 69 0.99 0. 6 2
(3.41) ( -3.06 ) (2.81) (2.48) (0. 5 9) (-2.55) (- 2 . 71 ) (2.41) (2.44) ( 2 . 7 1) (1 . 20 ) (1.42)
Sampl e In dep end e n ce-1988
R1 70 . 12 -18.06 1.20 0.16 0. 2 9 -0.02 - 0 . 68 1 . 2 8 0. 4 2
(1.94) ( -1.67 ) (1.48) (3.37) (1. 2 6) (-2.30) (- 1 . 98 ) ( 1 . 2 3)
R2 88 . 94 -23.63 1.60 0.15 0. 2 5 -0.02 - 0 . 79 1.94 1.72 1 . 2 7 0. 5 4
(2.59) ( -2.30 ) (2.08) (3.22) (1. 1 6) (-2.02) (- 2 . 52 ) (3.03) (1.63) ( 1 . 3 6)
R3 84 . 16 -22.34 1.51 0.14 0. 2 0 -0.02 - 0 . 74 1.77 1.88 1 . 4 8 -0.21 0.64 0. 5 1
(2.34) ( -2.09 ) (1.89) (3.08) (0. 8 7) (-1.93) (- 2 . 24 ) (2.51) (1.68) ( 1 . 4 3) (-0.24) (0.61)
Sampl e 1960-1973
R1 43 . 68 -12.01 0.83 0.10 0. 2 1 -0. 0 03 - 0 . 18 2 . 1 8 0. 2 0
(1.35) ( -1.22 ) (1.12) (2.29) (0. 9 3) (-0.31) (- 0 . 56 ) ( 2 . 2 4)
R2 22 . 73 -5.84 0.37 0.07 0. 1 0 0.002 - 0 . 16 0.15 2.01 2 . 2 9 0. 2 3
(0.64) ( -0.54 ) (0.47) (1.66) (0. 4 5) (0.24) (- 0 . 50 ) (0.23) (1.77) ( 2 . 3 8)
R3 25 . 41 -6.40 0.39 0.08 0. 1 7 0.002 - 0 . 18 0.17 2.09 1 . 7 3 1 . 44 0.21 0. 2 5
(0.70) ( -0.59 ) (0.48) (1.82) (0. 7 1) (0.18) (- 0 . 56 ) (0.25) (1.80) ( 1 . 7 0) (1 . 70 ) (0.20)
Sampl e 1974-1980
R1 -3.88 3.51 - 0 . 31 0.05 0. 2 9 -0.06 - 0 . 45 0 . 2 3 0. 0 8
(-0.07) (0.25) (- 0 . 32 ) (0.49) (0. 6 0) (-2.72) (- 0 . 67 ) ( 0 . 1 1)
R2 -1.46 2.96 - 0 . 30 0.01 0. 2 1 -0.05 - 0 . 55 2.51 3.82 0 . 4 9 0. 1 6
(-0.03) (0.22) (- 0 . 33 ) (0.14) (0. 4 4) (-2.24) (- 0 . 85 ) (1.91) (1.73) ( 0 . 2 4)
R3 -14.70 6.26 - 0 . 51 0.007 - 0 . 00 9 -0.05 - 0 . 34 1.87 4.34 1 . 3 9 -0.98 2.59 0. 1 6
(-0.30) (0.46) (- 0 . 54 ) (0.07) (-0.01) (-2.18) (- 0 . 51 ) (1.35) (1.90) ( 0 . 6 5) (-0.54) (1.20)
Sampl e 1981-1988
R1 198.05 -50.19 3.28 0.05 0. 1 9 -0.02 - 1 . 80 0 . 6 5 0. 5 4
(5.81) ( -5.32 ) ( 4 . 97 ) (0.76) (0. 5 6) (-1.45) (- 3 . 67 ) ( 0 . 4 3)
R2 199.22 -50.29 3.26 0.04 0. 1 9 -0.02 - 1 . 86 1.16 1.61 0 . 8 4 0. 5 3
(5.77) ( -5.27 ) (4.88) (0.62) (0. 5 4) (-1.21) (- 3 . 73 ) (1.14) (0.95) ( 0 . 5 4)
R3 197.05 -49.74 3.22 0.04 0. 1 5 -0.02 - 1 . 81 1.04 1.72 1 . 0 3 -0.17 0.55 0. 5 0
(5.46) ( -5.00 ) (4.62) (0.59) (0. 4 1) (-1.15) (- 3 . 44 ) (0.95) (0.94) ( 0 . 6 1) (-0.12) (0.32)
N o t e s: l og Y
0




sq uared in iti al cond iti on s, I/Y the i n v es tmen t-outpu t rati o
an d S c ho ol th e p erc en tage of w orki ng age p opu lati on i n sec onda ry sc h o ol ; F ra ct an i ndex of Ethn ic fractio n-
al i zatio n: Prig h t an in dex of p ol i tica l ri gh ts; Pi de v t h e pri ce o f i n v estment i n 19 60 in d evi atio n f ro m s ampl e
mean ; DFR is a du mm y for F rance as metrop ol ita n rul er, DD EP i s a d umm y f or Bri t i sh dep enden cie s, O i l
i s a d umm y for o il pro d uci ng countries , D R1 (DR4) i a a d umm y whi c h assume s th e v a lu e o f the GNP/GD P
rati o i n 1960 i f i t i s s mall er than 0. 9 4 (larg er than 0.99) an d zero othe rw i se.T ABL ES 24
T a b l e 10 : W o rl d Gro wth Regre ss i ons
S a mp le 1960-1988
Regres sio ns B asi c V a ria n t 1 V a riant 2





( -4.48 ) (-4. 6 2) (- 4 . 28 )
SEC 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(1.00) (1.18) (0.95)
PRIM - 0 . 0 0001 0 . 00 004 -0.0000 03
( -0.15 ) (0.05) (- 0 . 04 )
G /Y -0.097 -0.097 -0.103
( -3.28 ) (-3. 2 3) (- 3 . 30 )
REV -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
( -1.38 ) (-1. 2 1) (- 1 . 23 )
A S SAS 0.00 1 - 0 . 00 09 0 . 00 1
(0.28) (0.27) (0.42)
PID EV -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
( -1.16 ) (-1. 0 2) (- 0 . 85 )
I / Y 0.05 0 0. 0 49 0 . 05 2
(2.49) (2.46) (2.55)
F ER T -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
( -2.60 ) (-2. 3 4) (- 2 . 08 )
AFRICA -0.021 -0.017
( -5.14 ) (-3. 1 1)
LA TIN -0.010 -0.009 -0.010
( -2.89 ) (-2. 6 1) (- 2 . 78 )
DF R 0. 0 05 0 . 01 0
(1.17) (2.07)
DD EP 0. 0 09 0 . 00 7
(1.04) (0.85)
DR A IN -0.00006 -0.000 2





N o t e s: l og Y
0
rep resen ts i ni ti al cond iti on s, SEC an d PR I M secon dary and pri mary educa tion attai nments, G/Y
the go v ernme n t exp endi tures to outp ut rati o, I/Y th e inv estmen t-ou tput ra tio, REV the num b er of rev-
ol uti ons a nd cou ps p e r year, ASSAS th e n um b er p er mi ll i on of p op ul atio n of p ol i tical assa ssi nati ons p er
y ea r, PIDEV is t h e devi ati on o f th e Price o f i n v es tmen t f ro m the samp le mean , FER T the ferti li t y rate;
AFRICA i s a d umm y for Sub - S ahara Afri ca a nd LA T IN a d umm y for La tin an d Sou th A meri ca, excl ud in g
Mex ico . A l l these v ari abl es are f ro m Barro ( 1 991). D rai n i s the G N P /GDP ra tio in 1960 ; DFR is a du mm y
for A fri can cou n tries wi t h F ran ce a s metro p ol i t a n rul er an d DDEP i s a d umm y f o r Africa n coun tri es w h ic h
w ere Bri t i sh d ep en denci es. Bas ic corre sp on ds to regress ion 29 of B arro (1991 ) for ou r d ata set.